The current research object of management science is becoming increasingly monotonous, and the emergence of decentralized autonomous organization (DAO) diversified the present field. It provides a new perspective and an opportunity to test existing theories. DAO is a new form of organization based on blockchain technology, which does not have a centralized leader or management mechanism. Instead, it achieves self-control through smart contracts and achieves human-machine governance through tokens. There is a widespread concern in the industry about the substitutability of DAO for corporatism, while the academic research has just begun. Based on the definition of DAO-related concepts, this paper systematically analyzes the similarities and differences between DAO and corporatism, and finds that its concept originates from the classical decision theory, and its behavior conforms to the basic characteristics of boundary-less organization, virtual organization, and network organization. Further, the deficiencies of DAO are analyzed from the four perspectives of agency problem, democratic system, information asymmetry, and decentralization, and it is pointed out that there is an impossible triangle of “decentralization–efficient decision–making unique consensus” in DAO governance. Finally, the contribution and value of DAO to organizational boundaries are discussed. This paper aims to build a bridge between emerging phenomena and traditional theories, so as to provide a reference and enhance the interaction between industry and academia.