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10677With the rocketing of the industrial economy and the digital economy, the EU has introduced a heavyweight competition policy in 2019, “Competition Policy for the Digital Era”. The relevant market theory is becoming the key area of antitrust economic research, and its academic and practical status has continuously improved. Constructing and developing the relevant market theory in the Digital Era has become a significant research field. This article comprehensively reviews the relevant market theory evolution and frontier under assumptions of the unilateral market and the bilateral market, and tries to provide a theoretical and practical reference for the current antitrust economic research and law enforcement practice. The study shows that: （1）The relevant market theory is crucial in antitrust economics. Although some articles advocate weakening market definition, in most cases, the relevant market theory is still the base point for antitrust analysis. （2）The bilateral market characteristics of the Digital Economy present theoretical and practical challenges to the relevant market definition. Traditional methods, based on the unilateral market, cannot be directly applied to antitrust research in the Digital Economy. （3）The academic circles have conducted extensive research on the relevant market theory in the bilateral market, but there are still many shortcomings in theoretical research and empirical analysis. We are so “ignorant” about the relevant market theory in the Digital Era.
/ Journals / Journal of Finance and Economics
Journal of Finance and Economics
LiuYuanchun, Editor-in-Chief
ZhengChunrong, Vice Executive Editor-in-Chief
YaoLan BaoXiaohua HuangJun, Vice Editor-in-Chief
Relevant Market Theory in the Digital Era：From the Unilateral Market to the Bilateral Market
Journal of Finance and Economics Vol. 46, Issue 03, pp. 109 - 123 (2020) DOI:10.16538/j.cnki.jfe.2020.03.008
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References
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Cite this article
Chen Lin, Zhang Jiacai. Relevant Market Theory in the Digital Era：From the Unilateral Market to the Bilateral Market[J]. Journal of Finance and Economics, 2020, 46(3): 109-123.
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