4142 
24282012年调研新规大幅提高了调研信息披露的及时性和内容详细程度，对于改善分析师私有信息获取过程的透明度、落实公平信息披露原则至关重要。文章基于2009—2017年深市上市公司数据，探究了2012年调研新规背景下与上市公司具有社会关系的分析师（即“嵌入式分析师”）的调研行为及其信息效应的变化。研究发现，2012年调研新规出台后，嵌入式分析师参与独家调研的可能性显著降低。与嵌入式分析师联合调研的分析师和公募基金能够更加有效地通过调研获取信息，嵌入式分析师的这种信息溢出效应在公司信息披露专有成本较高时更加显著。上述结论在改变研究设计和控制内生性问题后依然成立。进一步研究发现，嵌入式分析师有助于联合调研问答环节的充分沟通。文章研究表明，2012年调研新规规范了嵌入式分析师行为，提高了资本市场的信息透明度，促进了资本市场健康发展。
联合调研与“关系型”分析师的新价值
摘要
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引用本文
王俊杰, 刘定, 刘芬芬. 联合调研与“关系型”分析师的新价值[J]. 财经研究, 2023, 49(3): 94-109.
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