高管薪酬与公司业绩的敏感性因素分析——金融业的证据(2000～2005年)
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财经研究 2008 年 第 34 卷第 01 期, 页码：95 - 106
摘要
参考文献
摘要
高管的薪酬取决于很多方面的因素,既有主观因素又有客观因素。金融企业与其他制造性企业又有较大的不同,影响薪酬的因素较为特别。文章实证研究了我国上市金融类企业高管薪酬与其业绩之间敏感性的影响因素。研究结果表明,公司规模、负债比率、收益波动性与敏感性负相关,外资进入、高管任职时间、金融监管以及董事会的独立性对这一敏感性的影响不显著。
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引用本文
邵平, 刘林, 孔爱国. 高管薪酬与公司业绩的敏感性因素分析——金融业的证据(2000～2005年)[J]. 财经研究, 2008, 34(1): 95–106.
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