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1关于高管薪酬业绩敏感性的现有研究文献也有采用change模型,但方军雄(2009)指出在中国的资本市场上采用change模型使模型的解释能力较level模型大幅下降,因此本文采用level模型对假设进行检验。

1本文并未采用公司市场价值作为企业业绩的代理变量,因为中国资本市场发展时间较短,发育程度较低,价格信号中包含了太多噪音,对企业高管当期行为的信号传递作用较弱(Engel等,2003)。另外,中国企业尤其是国有企业在薪酬契约中较少地包含公司市场价值因素,因此在进行薪酬问题研究时公司市场价值因素缺乏重要性。杜兴强等(2007)发现,上市公司经理人的薪酬与公司市场价值之间缺乏相关性。辛清泉等(2009)发现,虽然国有上市公司经理人的薪酬与公司股票市场回报之间的相关性随市场化发展而有所增强,但两者之间的相关性仍较弱。

1调查涉及全国31个省、自治区和直辖市,调查对象主要是一些企业和企业领导人。有关信任问题的设计是“根据您的经验,您认为哪五个地区的企业比较守信用(按顺序排列)?”已有研究表明,该调查数据是有关我国地区间声誉型信任的良好反映(夏纪军,2005)。

2限于篇幅,描述性统计、相关系数和单变量检验结果无法详细报告,有兴趣的读者可向笔者索取。

1为了检验回归结果的稳健性,我们借鉴何小杨(2011)的做法,将Supply和Customer分别变化衡量方式:Dum_Supply为虚拟变量,如果向前五大供应商的采购合计值占全年采购合计值的比例大于50%则为1,否则为0;Dum_Customer为虚拟变量,如果向前五大客户的销售合计值占全年销售合计值的比例大于50%则为1,否则为0。

1限于篇幅,稳健性检验结果未列出,有兴趣的读者可向作者索取。