高管报酬隐性激励的实证研究
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财经研究 2006 年 第 32 卷第 03 期, 页码：58 - 65
摘要
参考文献
摘要
文章运用虚拟变量改变业绩评价指标斜率的方法,考察了成长性不同的两类上市公司的高管年度报酬与会计收益和市场股价这两个业绩指标的关系。研究后发现,年度报酬包含着隐性长期激励的报酬形式。与稳定成长公司相比,高成长公司会在市场股价指标上赋予较大权重,在会计收益指标上赋予较小权重;同时,高成长公司会给予高管较大的保底报酬。
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[2]陈志广.高级管理人员报酬的实证研究[J].当代经济科学,2002,(5):58~63.
[3]李增泉.激励机制与企业绩效[J].会计研究,2000,(1):24~30.
[4]魏刚.高级管理层激励与上市公司经营绩效[J].经济研究,2000,(3):32~39.
[5]Agrawal,Walking.Executive careers and compensation surrounding takeover bids[J].Journal of Finance,1994,(49):985~1014.
[6]Holmstrom Bengt.Moral hazard and observability[J].Bell Journal of Economics.1979,10(10):74~91.
[7]Holmstrom Bengt.Moral hazard in terms[J].Bell Journal of Economics.1982,(3):324~340.
[8]Jensen Michael C,Murphy Kevin J.Performance pay and top-management incentives[J].Journal of Political Economy,1990,98:225~264.
[9]Kim Oliver,Suh Yoon.Incentive efficiency of compensation based on accounting andmarket performance[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,1993,16:25~53.
[10]R Sloan.Accounting earnings and top executive compensation[J].Journal of Account-ing and Economics,1993,(1):55~100.
引用本文
张鸣, 陈震. 高管报酬隐性激励的实证研究[J]. 财经研究, 2006, 32(3): 58–65.
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