风险投资中的分阶段投资:一个人力资本的视角
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财经研究 2005 年 第 31 卷第 03 期, 页码：18 - 27
摘要
参考文献
摘要
文章通过一个套牢模型分析了在创业者的人力资本专有性向专用性转化过程中,风险资本家和创业者之间“双边承诺”问题的产生,解释了分阶段投资解决这一问题的作用机理。文章认为分阶段投资及与其配合的时间期权和非竞争条款本质上是相互关系专用性投资,合约双方通过相互专用性投资来“捆住”自己的手脚来取信于对方,以解决双边承诺问题,并得出以下结论:非人力资本专用性越强,每一阶段投资量越少;人力资本专用性越强,阶段投资量规模越大;分阶段投资中,每一阶段的投资额是递增的;阶段投资规模与预期收益增量正相关;分阶段投资通常有时间期权和非竞争条款与其配合,起到了在创业者人力资本投资前启动风险资本家投资的作用。
①在Hart和Moor的论文中并没有明确提出人力资本专有性的概念,但在其模型中创业者是不可替代的,没有他的人力资本投入,就没有项目的成功,非人力资本也会大幅贬值,这完全符合我们对人力资本专有性的定义。
②我们这里假设不存在谈判成本,因而没有租金的耗散。
③国内学者中关于人力资本是否具有抵押性是存在争论的,周其仁(1996)和张维迎(1996)从人力资本不可分离性出发认为没有抵押性,而方竹兰(1997)和杨瑞龙等(1998)则从人力资本的专用性出发认为有抵押性。这一争议实际涉及到差异价值物品抵押问题。对于风险资本家而言,由于人力资本的不可分离性,G=0,因而CV+θ/2+G
④引自Alchian和Woodward(1985,P 158)。
[1]GompersPaulA Optimal investment, monitoring, and the staging of venture capital[J].Journal ofFinance,1995,50:1461~1590
[2]GrossmanS J,O D Hart.The costs and benefits of ownership:A theory of vertical andlateral integration[J].Journal ofPoliticalEconomy,1986,94(4):691~719
[3]HartO,J Moore.A theory of debt based on the alienability of human capital[J].Quar terlyJournal ofEconomics,1994,109:841~879
[4]KleinB,LefflerK B.The role of market forces in assuring contractual performance[J].Journal ofPoliticalEconomy,1982,89:615~641
[5]LernerJosh.The syndication of venture capital investments[J].FinancialManagement,1994,23:16~27
[6]NeherD V.Staged financing:An agency perspective[J].Review ofEconomicStudies,1999,66:255~274
[7]SahlmanW A The structure and governance of venture capital organizations[J].JournalofFinancialEconomics,1990,27:473~521
[8]Telser,Lester.A theory of self enforcing agreements[J].Journal ofBusiness,1981,53(February):27~44
[9]WilliamsonO E.Credible commitments:Using hostages to support exchange[J].A mericanEconomicReview,1983,83:519~540
[10]WilliamsonO E.The economic institutions of capitalism:Firms, markets, relationalcontracting[M].NewYork,1985.
[11]P A Koss,B CurtisEaton.Co specific investments, hold up and self enforcing con tracts[J].Journal ofEconomicBehavior&Organization,1997,Vol32:457~470
②我们这里假设不存在谈判成本,因而没有租金的耗散。
③国内学者中关于人力资本是否具有抵押性是存在争论的,周其仁(1996)和张维迎(1996)从人力资本不可分离性出发认为没有抵押性,而方竹兰(1997)和杨瑞龙等(1998)则从人力资本的专用性出发认为有抵押性。这一争议实际涉及到差异价值物品抵押问题。对于风险资本家而言,由于人力资本的不可分离性,G=0,因而CV+θ/2+G
④引自Alchian和Woodward(1985,P 158)。
[1]GompersPaulA Optimal investment, monitoring, and the staging of venture capital[J].Journal ofFinance,1995,50:1461~1590
[2]GrossmanS J,O D Hart.The costs and benefits of ownership:A theory of vertical andlateral integration[J].Journal ofPoliticalEconomy,1986,94(4):691~719
[3]HartO,J Moore.A theory of debt based on the alienability of human capital[J].Quar terlyJournal ofEconomics,1994,109:841~879
[4]KleinB,LefflerK B.The role of market forces in assuring contractual performance[J].Journal ofPoliticalEconomy,1982,89:615~641
[5]LernerJosh.The syndication of venture capital investments[J].FinancialManagement,1994,23:16~27
[6]NeherD V.Staged financing:An agency perspective[J].Review ofEconomicStudies,1999,66:255~274
[7]SahlmanW A The structure and governance of venture capital organizations[J].JournalofFinancialEconomics,1990,27:473~521
[8]Telser,Lester.A theory of self enforcing agreements[J].Journal ofBusiness,1981,53(February):27~44
[9]WilliamsonO E.Credible commitments:Using hostages to support exchange[J].A mericanEconomicReview,1983,83:519~540
[10]WilliamsonO E.The economic institutions of capitalism:Firms, markets, relationalcontracting[M].NewYork,1985.
[11]P A Koss,B CurtisEaton.Co specific investments, hold up and self enforcing con tracts[J].Journal ofEconomicBehavior&Organization,1997,Vol32:457~470
引用本文
张珉, 卓越. 风险投资中的分阶段投资:一个人力资本的视角[J]. 财经研究, 2005, 31(3): 18–27.
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