国有跨国公司境外企业公司治理研究——基于双重型、叠加式委托代理的视角
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财经研究 2010 年 第 36 卷第 11 期, 页码：63 - 72
摘要
参考文献
摘要
国有跨国公司境外企业股权结构的相对集中或高度集中和产权关系的延伸,使其委托代理呈现出双重型、叠加式的特征。基于此特征,文章确立了双重型、叠加式委托代理理论并作为国有跨国公司境外企业公司治理研究的分析框架。研究结果表明,完善国有跨国公司境外企业公司治理的前提和基础在于委托代理链能否形成有效的传导机制以及各级委托链的委托人和代理人是否明确。在公司治理结构与机制优化的基础上,文章提出应从控股股东或大股东对经营者和中小股东对其代理人两条途径同时降低公司治理成本,并通过模型对控股股东或大股东获取租金的合理界限与范围进行了界定。
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[5]郑志刚.投资者之间的利益冲突和公司治理机制的整合[J].经济研究,2004,(2):115-125.
[6]周新军.跨国公司境外企业公司治理机制探析[J].南开管理评论,2001,(4):62-66.
[7]Berle A,Means G.The modern corporation and private property[M].New York:Mae-millan,1932.
[8]Dielt H.Capital markets and corporate governance in Japan,Germany and United Statesorganizational response to market inefficiencies[M].London:Rutledge,1998.
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[15]Weinstein,David E,Yishay Yafeh.On the costs of a bank-centered financial system:Evidence from the changing main bank relations in Japan[R].Harvard University,1994.
引用本文
宋光辉, 王晓晖, 秦全德. 国有跨国公司境外企业公司治理研究——基于双重型、叠加式委托代理的视角[J]. 财经研究, 2010, 36(11): 63–72.
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