, 2, 3
8018 
8898At present, China’s environmental problem has become a problem that has to be solved on the road to the healthy development of the economy and society. Under the Chinese style of decentralization, performance evaluation becomes an important factor affecting the implementation of environmental policies. Based on the strategic interaction among local governments, this paper combines the theories of decentralization, administrative subcontract and political tournament, and puts forward relevant hypotheses: the greening of performance assessment helps make good competition between local governments in environmental governance; decentralization affects the relationship between performance appraisal and environmental governance strategic interaction among local governments. This paper uses the panel data of 272 prefecture-level cities in China between 2003 and 2014 to build the spatial Durbin model, and uses maximum likelihood estimation（MLE）to get the results after regression: reasonable performance evaluation index and decentralization system can make environmental governance develop in the direction of ‘benign competition’. As a whole, the environmental governance between local governments has a strategic interaction of ‘imitative competition’. Based on political tournament theory, this paper empirically studies the impact of performance assessment on the interaction of environmental governance strategies among cities in China. Results show that environmental performance indicators enhance the strategic interaction of " race to the top” among cities, and economic performance indicators weaken the " race to the top” strategic interaction among cities. Furthermore, based on the theories of " political tournament” and " administrative contract”, we examine the impact of the combination of performance appraisal and decentralization on the strategic interaction between local governments. Environmental performance indicators combined with higher authority can weaken the " race to the bottom” strategic interaction, and enhance the " race to the top” strategic interaction. If equipped with higher financial power, it will weaken the " race to the bottom” strategic interaction. The combination of economic performance and higher authority enhances the competitive interaction strategy and weakens the " race to the top” strategic interaction. If the financial power is bigger, it will enhance the " race to the bottom” strategic interaction. Accordingly, policy implications are given as follows: to establish the " linkage mechanism” of environmental governance, namely " joint defense and joint control” is the way to effectively control the environment; how to set reasonable performance evaluation index by the central government to hold the nose of an ox of local government environmental governance is the priority among priorities; a reasonable set of performance evaluation indicators, accompanied by reasonable decentralization system, namely environmental performance indicators as " hard constraints” with the property rights and power, will encourage local government environmental governance to benign competition, to make the implementation of environmental policies get twice the result with half the effort.
/ Journals / Journal of Finance and Economics
Journal of Finance and Economics
LiuYuanchun, Editor-in-Chief
ZhengChunrong, Vice Executive Editor-in-Chief
YaoLan BaoXiaohua HuangJun, Vice Editor-in-Chief
Performance Evaluation and Environmental Governance: From a Perspective of Strategic Interaction between Local Governments
Journal of Finance and Economics Vol. 44, Issue 05, pp. 4 - 22 (2018) DOI:10.16538/j.cnki.jfe.2018.05.001
Summary
References
Summary
[1] Chen Shuo, Gaolin. The Relationship between the Central and the Local Government: a Re-evaluation Both of the Measurement of the Fiscal Decentralization and of the Functioning Mechaanism[J]. Management World, 2012, (6): 43-58. (In Chinese)
[2] Fu Jingyan, Li Lisha. A Case Study on the Environmental Regulation, the Factor Endowment and the International Competitiveness in Industries[J]. Management World, 2010,(10):87-98. (In Chinese)
[3] Fu Yong, Zhang Yan. China’s Decentralization and Fiscal Expenditure Structure Bias: The Cost of Competition for Growth[J]. Management World, 2007，（3）：4-12. (In Chinese)
[4] Fu Yong. Why China’s Decentralization Differs?[J]. The Journal of World Economy, 2008，（11）：16-25. (In Chinese)
[5] Han Chao, Zhang Weiguang. Regulation Officials Incentive and Behavior Preference[J]. Management World, 2016，（2）：82- 94. (In Chinese)
[6] Huang Shoufeng. A Study of Impacts of Fiscal Decentralization on Smog Pollution[J]. The Journal of World Economy, 2017，（2）：127-152. (In Chinese)
[7] Jiang Dequan, Jiang Guohua, Chen Donghua. Local Leaders’ Promotion and Economic Efficiency: An Empirical Study from the Performance Evaluation and Heterogeneity Perspectives [J]. China Industrial Economics, 2015，(10)：21-36. (In Chinese)
[8] Li Tao, Zhou Yean. A Study on the Competition in Expenditure between China’s Local Government [J]. Management World, 2009，（2）：12-22. (In Chinese)
[9] Li Wenjing, Zheng Manni. Governance Mechanism of Air Pollution and Its Effects——Evidence from Chinese Prefecture-level Cities[J]. China Industrial Economics, 2016，(4)：93-109. (In Chinese)
[10] Qiao Baoyun, Fan Jianyong, Feng Xingyuan. Fiscal Decentralization and Compulsory Primary Education in China[J]. Social Sciences in China, 2005，（6）：37-46. (In Chinese)
[11] Ran Ran. Political Incentives and Local Environmental Governance under a “Pressurized System” [J]. Comparative Economic and Social Systems, 2013, (3): 111-118. (In Chinese)
[12] Shao Chaodui, Su Danni, Deng Hongtu. Housing Prices, Land Finance and City Agglomeration Characteristics:the Road of China's City Development[J]. Management World, 2016, (2): 19-31. (In Chinese)
[13] Shao Shuai, Li Xin , Cao Jianhua, et al. China's Economic Policy Choices for Governing Smog Pollution Based on Spatial Spillover Effects[J]. Economic Research Journal, 2016，（9）：73 − 88. (In Chinese)
[14] Tian Guoqiang, Cheng Xudong. The Reform of the Ecological Civilization System and Environmental Pollution Control [J]. Research Report on the Policy of the Institute of Higher Research of Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, 2014, (3): 1 - 21. (In Chinese)
[15] Wang Yongqin, Zhang Yan, Zhang Yuan, et al. On China' s Development Model：The Costs and Benefits of China' s Decentralization Approach to Transition[J]. Economic Research Journal, 2007，（1）：4 − 16. (In Chinese)
[16] Yin Heng, Xu Yanchao. On the Interactions of Local Public Infrastructure Expenditure in China[J]. Economic Research Journal, 2011，（7）：55 − 64. (In Chinese)
[17] Yu Wenchao, Gao Nan, Gong Qiang. Public Demands，Local Officials’Incentive and Environmental Governance[J]. Zhejiang Social Sciences, 2014，（5）：23 − 35. (In Chinese)
[18] Yu Xiancai, Zhu Meicong. Fiscal Decentralization and the Efficiency of Local Medical Supply: An Investigation Based on Provincial Panel Data from 1997-2011[J]. Journal of Finance and Economics, 2015，（9）：42 − 52. (In Chinese)
[19] Zhang Hua. Strategic Interaction of Regional Environmental Regulation——An Explanation on the Universality of Incomplete Enforcement of Environmental Regulation[J]. China Industrial Economics, 2016，（7）：74 − 90. (In Chinese)
[20] Zhang Ke, Wang Dongfang, Zhou Haiyan. Regional Endogenetic Strategic Interaction of Environmental Protection Investment and Emission[J]. China Industrial Economics, 2016，（2）：68 − 82. (In Chinese)
[21] Zhang Wenbin, Zhang Lifan, Zhang Keyun. The State and Evolution of the Competition in Environmental Regulatory Stringency on China’s Provincial Level[J]. Management World, 2010，（12）：34 − 44. (In Chinese)
[22] Zhang Yan, Gong Liutang. The Fenshuizhi Reform, Fiscal Decentralization, and Economic Growth in China[J]. China Economic Quarterly, 2005，（1）：75-08. (In Chinese)
[23] Zhang Zhongyuan, Zhao Guoqing. Environmental Regulation and FDI Spillover Effect[J]. Economic Theory and Business Management, 2012，（2）：28 − 36. (In Chinese)
[24] Zhao Xiaowei. Inter-local Government Strategies of Environmental Regulation Competition and Its Economic Growth Effect[J]. Finance and Trade Economics, 2014，（10）：105-113. (In Chinese)
[25] Zheng Siqi, Wan Guanghua, Sun Weizeng, et al. The Demand of the Public and the Control over the City Environment[J]. 2013，（6）：72 − 84. (In Chinese)
[26] Zhou Li’an. Administrative Subcontract[J]. Society, 2014，（6）：1-38. (In Chinese)
[27] Zhou Li’an. Governing China’s Local Officials: An Analysis of Promotion Tournament Model[J]. Economic Research Journal, 2007，（7）：36-50. (In Chinese)
[28] Zhou Li’an. The Incentive and Cooperation of Government Officials in the Political Tournaments: An Interpretation of the Prolonged Local Protectionism and Duplicative Investments in China[J]. Economic Research Journal, 2004，（6）：33 − 40. (In Chinese)
[29] Zhu Pingfang, Zhang Zhengyu, Jiang Guolin. Empirical Study of the Relationship between FDI and Environmental Regulation: An Intergovernmental Competition Perspective[J]. Economic Research Journal, 2011，（6）：133 − 145. (In Chinese)
[30] Becker R, Henderson V. Effects of air quality regulations on polluting industries[J]. Journal of Political Economy, 2000, 108（2）: 379—421.
[31] Besley T, Case A. Incumbent behavior: Vote-seeking, tax-setting, and yardstick competition[J]. American Economic Review, 1995, 85（1）: 25-45.
[32] Blanchard O, Shleifer A. Federalism with and without political centralization: China versus Russia[J]. IMF Staff Papers, 2001, 48: 171-179.
[33] Chen Z, Kahn M E, Liu Y, et al. The consequences of spatially differentiated water pollution regulation in China[R]. NBER Working Papers No. 22507, 2016.
[34] Copeland B R, Taylor M S. North-south trade and the environment[J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1994, 109（3）: 755-787.
[35] El Hedi Arouri M, Caporale G M, Rault C, et al. Environmental regulation and competitiveness: Evidence from Romania[J]. Ecological Economics, 2012, 81: 130-139.
[36] Kanaroglou P S, Adams M D, De Luca P F, et al. Estimation of sulfur dioxide air pollution concentrations with a spatial autoregressive model[J]. Atmospheric Environment, 2013, 79: 421-427.
[37] Li H B, Zhou L A. Political turnover and economic performance: The incentive role of personnel control in China[J]. Journal of Public Economics, 2005, 89（9-10）: 1743-1762.
[38] Lipscomb M, Mobarak A M. Decentralization and pollution spillovers: Evidence from the re-drawing of county borders in Brazil[J]. Review of Economic Studies, 2017, 84（1）: 464-502.
[39] List J A, Millimet D L, Fredriksson P G, et al. Effects of environmental regulations on manufacturing plant births: Evidence from a propensity score matching estimator[J]. Review of Economics and Statistics, 2003, 85（4）: 944-952.
[40] Sigman H. Decentralization and environmental quality: An international analysis of water pollution levels and variation[J]. Land Economics, 2014, 90（1）: 114-130.
[41] Vogel D. Trading up: Consumer and environmental regulation in a global economy[M]. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995: 259.
Cite this article
Zhang Caiyun, Su Danni, Lu Ling, et al. Performance Evaluation and Environmental Governance: From a Perspective of Strategic Interaction between Local Governments[J]. Journal of Finance and Economics, 2018, 44(5): 4-22.
Export Citations as:
For
ISSUE COVER
RELATED ARTICLES
