国家医保谈判作为促进医疗、医保、医药“三医”协同的制度创新,为新时代深化医药卫生体制改革、增进人民健康福祉提供了有效方案。文章基于2016—2020年抗癌类医保谈判药品的全国销售数据以及2010—2018年各类癌症的死亡率数据,运用多时点双重差分法,评估了国家医保谈判的经济效应与健康效应。研究发现,对于医药厂商而言,医保谈判政策实施使相关抗癌药品的销售量和销售收入均显著上升,其对销售利润的影响则取决于药品的成本水平。对于患者而言,该政策实施后对应癌症类型的死亡人数显著下降。异质性分析表明,该政策效果在有更多对症谈判药品的癌症类型样本中更为显著,并且在较为罕见的癌症类型中,城市地区的政策效果更加显著。进一步的成本收益分析发现,医保谈判在合理的成本范围内拯救了众多患者的生命,具有较好的经济收益。文章综合评估了国家医保谈判在抗癌领域产生的社会经济价值,并为进一步提升医保基金使用效能提供了有益参考。
和衷共济,利在其中:国家医保谈判的经济效应与健康效应
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引用本文
毛晖, 张泽丰, 陈政弘. 和衷共济,利在其中:国家医保谈判的经济效应与健康效应[J]. 财经研究, 2025, 51(9): 64-78.
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