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128文章以2007—2021年上市公司为研究对象，运用连续双重差分法考察了“稳金融”政策对企业劳动雇佣的影响。研究发现，资管新规实施后，影子银行化程度较高的企业劳动雇佣水平显著上升。机制分析显示，资管新规通过投资替代机制、流动性资金占用机制和银行信贷甄别机制影响企业的劳动雇佣水平。异质性分析表明，资管新规对劳动雇佣的促进作用在会计信息质量较高、高新技术属性明显以及内部治理完善的企业中更加突出。调节效应分析发现，企业对不确定性的感知程度越高，资管新规对企业雇佣的促进作用越强。经济后果分析显示，资管新规提升了影子银行化规模较大企业的全要素生产率，并降低了其经营风险。文章为防范系统性金融风险和促进就业提供了理论依据和政策参考。
稳金融是否能稳就业？——来自资管新规的证据
摘要
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韩珣, 安然, 彭俞超. 稳金融是否能稳就业？——来自资管新规的证据[J]. 财经研究, 2025, 51(2): 109-122.
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