In recent years, the impact of economic policies, including national industrial policies, on innovation activities of micro-enterprise has increasingly become a focus of attention in the academic community. In innovation investment decisions, there are two key influencing factors: the basic motivation for allocating resources for innovation and the ability to obtain necessary financing tools （ Peneder, 2008）. The literature exploring the impact of industrial policies （as government incentives） and credit allocation （as a resource allocation mechanism in the market） on innovation efficiency mainly focuses on the following three aspects: First, research the impact of government supports on the effectiveness of R&D and innovation activities. Second, analyze the influence of certain market factors on the R&D innovation efficiency of the company. Third, analyze the impact of government supports on the economic consequences of R&D innovations. This article takes the samples of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies during the " 12th Five-Year Plan” period （2011−2015） as the inspection object, and examines the impact of industrial policies and credit allocation as an external factor on the efficiency of the company’s innovation, in order to test the interactive relevance among government policies, credit allocation and innovation output. Our research shares similarity to the above literature, while it has its own differences: First, our research focuses on the process part of innovation, not on the consequences. Second, our research perspective is to consider industrial subsidies and tax incentives as the industrial financial stimulation measures, and to consider credit availability mainly as a market allocation drive rather than as an incentive measure for industrial policy credits. Third, the existing studies have shown that: in countries with more developed stock markets, compared to the credit market, it is much easier to promote the innovation level of companies which have external financing constraints; and the development of credit markets seems to have hindered the level of innovation in industries with the above-mentioned characteristics （Po-Hsuan, et al., 2014）. Based on the above three considerations, we combine the analysis of industrial policies and credit allocation to reveal the regulatory effects of the interaction between government forces and market forces. The empirical results of this paper show that industrial policy, with the help of policy guidance and fiscal measures, stimulates the increase of patent output of enterprises with supports from industrial policies; and for enterprises with more external financing access, on the contrary, it will weaken the induced stimulatory effects of industrial policies （or showed a " U-shaped” relationship）. Further studies have shown that the mechanism of the above-mentioned regulatory effects is: there is a substitution effect between financial assistance and credit allocation. The conclusions of this paper provide the experience on how to coordinate the role of the government and market forces, and also have an important reference value for people to deeply understand the effects of industrial policies.
Industrial Policies, Credit Allocation and Innovation Efficiency
Journal of Finance and Economics Vol. 44, Issue 07, pp. 142 - 152,封三 (2018) DOI:10.16538/j.cnki.jfe.2018.07.011
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Cite this article
Feng Feipeng. Industrial Policies, Credit Allocation and Innovation Efficiency[J]. Journal of Finance and Economics, 2018, 44(7): 142-152.