经济增长目标影响了企业风险承担吗?——基于市场和政府双重视角的考察

Does Economic Growth Target Affect Enterprise Risk-taking? Based on the Dual Perspectives of Market and Government

黄亮雄,马明辉,王贤彬

2021 第 47 卷 第 01 期 页码 62-76

DOI: 10.16538/j.cnki.jfe.20200917.304

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摘要

中国经济的增长在很大程度上受到中央和地方政府政治和财政激励的影响。地方政府每年都制定明确的经济增长目标以指导地方发展。虽然许多研究从宏观经济的角度研究了该目标的作用,但很少有研究具体考察增长目标在微观经济中的作用方式。文章从地方政府经济增长目标的角度,匹配2009−2015年233个地级以上城市经济增长目标数据和2 381家沪深A股上市公司数据,考察了政府经济发展规划如何影响企业风险承担水平。研究发现,地方经济增长目标的提高显著增加了企业风险承担水平,且在更换了企业风险承担和经济增长目标衡量方法以及考虑内生性问题后,结论依然存在。在外部资源的调节效应方面,经济增长目标对能获得高政府补助、融资约束程度低以及能获得高贷款的企业的风险承受水平的提升作用更大。而异质性检验发现,地方经济增长目标对企业风险承担水平的刺激效应主要体现在具有一定规模、国有企业和具有政治关联的企业中;以及主要体现在发展水平较低和市场化程度较低的城市中。这些发现表明,地方经济增长目标对企业风险承担水平的正面影响主要还是地方政府主导资源分配的结果,而并非市场信号机制的结果。

Enterprise risk-taking is an index reflecting the tendency of enterprises to pursue high profits and the willingness to take risks. If enterprises want to develop and grow, they must choose some investment projects with high risk and high return. The performance of the real industry directly determines the economic growth. Therefore, a higher level of risk-taking can promote capital accumulation and promote the technological progress of the whole society. In China, economic growth is largely influenced by political and financial incentives from central and local governments. Local governments set clear economic growth targets every year to guide regional development. Although many studies have studied the role of growth target from the perspective of macro-economy, few studies have specifically examined the role of growth target in microeconomics. We put forward the following hypothesis: In order to achieve the goals set, local governments may introduce diversified support policies, and even intervene in the operation of enterprises. In other words, high goals will increase the risk level of local enterprises.

From the perspective of local governments’ economic growth goals, this paper examines how economic development goals affect the level of enterprise risk-taking by matching the economic growth target data of 233 prefecture-level cities and 2381 Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2009 to 2015. It is found that the improvement of local economic growth target significantly increases the level of enterprise risk-taking. Specifically, for every 1% increase in economic growth target, the risk-taking of enterprises will increase by about 0.24%. After changing the measurement method of enterprise risk-taking and economic growth target and the fixed effect mode, and considering the lack of samples and endogenous problems, the conclusion still exists. In the moderating effect of external resources, this paper finds that enterprises with high government subsidies, enterprises with low degree of financing constraints and enterprises with high loans have a greater role in improving their risk tolerance level. The heterogeneity test also finds that the stimulating effect of local economic growth target on the level of enterprise risk-taking is mainly reflected in enterprises with relatively large scale, state-owned enterprises and enterprises with political connections, and mainly reflected in cities with low development level and low degree of marketization. These findings consistently show that the promotion of local economic growth goals on enterprise risk-taking level is mainly the result of resource allocation dominated by local governments, rather than the result of market signal mechanism.

The main contributions of this study are as follows: Firstly, most of the relevant researches investigate the level of enterprise risk-taking from the perspectives of internal structure and market factors, rarely from the economic perspective. From the perspectives of China’s developmental government and economic growth target management, this paper focuses on the impact of this macroeconomic policy on enterprise risk-taking, and broadens the existing research boundaries. Secondly, although a large amount of literature focuses on the macro effect of economic growth goals, there are few studies on the micro effect. It is helpful to understand the mechanism of economic growth target management system of Chinese government by establishing macro and micro theoretical connection. Our empirical analysis can provide enlightenment for the government to formulate economic growth target policies and help enterprises make reasonable management and investment decisions.

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