论LLSV法律来源论的缺陷性
上海财经大学学报 2007 年 第 09 卷第 04 期, 页码:26 - 33
摘要
参考文献
摘要
拉普特等人用数据来表明,法律来源于普通法系国家比法律来源于大陆法系国家特别是法国大陆法系国家能更好地保护投资者,而德国大陆法系国家和斯堪的纳维亚国家则介于这二者之间。公司所有权的集中程度在他们的研究中被认为是对投资者保护差的一种适应性反映。在本文,我们用中国和其他国家的证据来说明政治经济因素比法律来源论能更好地解释在中国的转型经济中对小股东保护差的原因。我们认为中国上市公司所有权非常集中的原因是政府决策的直接结果,也认为政府控制绝大部分上市公司在某种程度上减弱了对小股东的保护。
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[2][3][4][8]10R La Porta,et al·,“Law and Finance”,106(6)The Journal of Political Economy1113(1998)[LLSV1998]、第1152页、第1145页、第1145页。
[5][7]HSpamann,“On the Insignificance and/or Endogeneity of La Porta et al·'s'Anti-Director Rights Index'under Consistent Coding”,John Olin Center for Law,Economics,and Business Fellows'Discussion Paper,http://www·SSRN·com·
[6]S Djankov,et al·,“The Law and Economics of Self-Dealing”,Working Paper2005,ht://www·doingbusiness·org/documents/Protecting-Investors-Self-Dealing·pdf·
[9]A Shleifer and R Vishny,“Large Shareholders and Corporate Control”,3(1)The Journal of Political Econ-omy461(1986)·
1112J Coffee,Jr·,“The Rise of Dispersed Ownership:The Roles of Law and the State in the Separation of Ownership and Control”,111The Yale LawJournal1(2001)at25·
13141516171822LLSV1998,见注释2,第1151、1152、1146~1148、1146、1150~1151、1130、1150页。
19P·Lawton,“Directors Remuneration,Benefits and Extractions,An Analysis of Their Use,Abuse and Control in the Corporate Governance Context of Hong Kong”,4Australian Journal of Corporate Law430(1995)at434·
2021M·Graylord and C·Armitage,“All in the Family:Corporate Structure,Business Culture and Insider Dealing in Hong Kong”,3(1)Asia Pacific Law Review26(1993)at28,30·
23R·Lease et al·,“The Market Value of Capital in Publicly-Traded Corporations”,11The Journal of Fi-nancial Economics439(1993)·
242545M Roe,“Political Preconditions to Separating Ownership form Control”,53,35,32Stanford Law Re-view539(2000);MRoe,“Legal Origins and Modern Stock Markets”,John M·Olin Center for Law,Eco-nomics,and Business,Discussion Paper(Harvard Law School,2006),http://www·SSRN·com·
26M Roe,“Political Preconditions to Separating Ownership from Control”,53Stanford Law Review539(2000)at603·
2728293032333435384041424344考费,见注释11,第72~75、71、72、73、60、78、59、78、65、41~43、44、9、18、9~10页。
31张宗新和孙晔伟:《股权结构优化与上市公司治理的改进》,《经济评论》2001年第1期,第36页。
36D Berkowiy et al·,“Legal Institutions and International Trade Flow”,26Michigan Journal of International Law163(2004)at164·
37M Trebilcock and Jing Leng,“The Role of Formal Contract Law and Enforcement in Economic Develop-ment”,92Virginia Law Review1517(2006)at1519·
39罗尔,见注释24,第12~16页。
46北京:首都经济贸易大学出版社2001年版。
[2][3][4][8]10R La Porta,et al·,“Law and Finance”,106(6)The Journal of Political Economy1113(1998)[LLSV1998]、第1152页、第1145页、第1145页。
[5][7]HSpamann,“On the Insignificance and/or Endogeneity of La Porta et al·'s'Anti-Director Rights Index'under Consistent Coding”,John Olin Center for Law,Economics,and Business Fellows'Discussion Paper,http://www·SSRN·com·
[6]S Djankov,et al·,“The Law and Economics of Self-Dealing”,Working Paper2005,ht://www·doingbusiness·org/documents/Protecting-Investors-Self-Dealing·pdf·
[9]A Shleifer and R Vishny,“Large Shareholders and Corporate Control”,3(1)The Journal of Political Econ-omy461(1986)·
1112J Coffee,Jr·,“The Rise of Dispersed Ownership:The Roles of Law and the State in the Separation of Ownership and Control”,111The Yale LawJournal1(2001)at25·
13141516171822LLSV1998,见注释2,第1151、1152、1146~1148、1146、1150~1151、1130、1150页。
19P·Lawton,“Directors Remuneration,Benefits and Extractions,An Analysis of Their Use,Abuse and Control in the Corporate Governance Context of Hong Kong”,4Australian Journal of Corporate Law430(1995)at434·
2021M·Graylord and C·Armitage,“All in the Family:Corporate Structure,Business Culture and Insider Dealing in Hong Kong”,3(1)Asia Pacific Law Review26(1993)at28,30·
23R·Lease et al·,“The Market Value of Capital in Publicly-Traded Corporations”,11The Journal of Fi-nancial Economics439(1993)·
242545M Roe,“Political Preconditions to Separating Ownership form Control”,53,35,32Stanford Law Re-view539(2000);MRoe,“Legal Origins and Modern Stock Markets”,John M·Olin Center for Law,Eco-nomics,and Business,Discussion Paper(Harvard Law School,2006),http://www·SSRN·com·
26M Roe,“Political Preconditions to Separating Ownership from Control”,53Stanford Law Review539(2000)at603·
2728293032333435384041424344考费,见注释11,第72~75、71、72、73、60、78、59、78、65、41~43、44、9、18、9~10页。
31张宗新和孙晔伟:《股权结构优化与上市公司治理的改进》,《经济评论》2001年第1期,第36页。
36D Berkowiy et al·,“Legal Institutions and International Trade Flow”,26Michigan Journal of International Law163(2004)at164·
37M Trebilcock and Jing Leng,“The Role of Formal Contract Law and Enforcement in Economic Develop-ment”,92Virginia Law Review1517(2006)at1519·
39罗尔,见注释24,第12~16页。
46北京:首都经济贸易大学出版社2001年版。
引用本文
郁光华, 邵丽. 论LLSV法律来源论的缺陷性[J]. 上海财经大学学报, 2007, 9(4): 26–33.
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