营销员规模、佣金成本与寿险经营绩效
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上海财经大学学报 2013 年 第 15 卷第 04 期, 页码：67 - 74
摘要
参考文献
摘要
文章以2008-2011年中国主要寿险公司截面数据为样本,研究营销员规模和佣金成本对寿险经营绩效的影响。实证发现营销员人海战术不利于寿险经营绩效的提高;中资寿险公司粗放的佣金激励机制使赔付率和退保率上升,外资寿险公司佣金成本未对赔付率和退保率产生负面影响。为进一步证实该结论,文章采用DEA方法测度营销员效率,发现外资寿险公司营销员的营销效率和盈利效率优于中资寿险公司,说明有效率的营销员管理体制更有利于经营绩效的提高。
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[3]Cheng J.,Elyasiani E.,Tzu-Ting L.Market Reaction to Regulatory Action in the Insurance Industry:TheCase of Contingent Commission[J].The Journal of Risk and Insurance,2010,77(2):347-368.
[4]Dorfman.Reformation in Life Insurance Agents’Compensation[J].The Journal of Risk and Insurance,1976,43(3):447-461.
[5]Eckardt M.The Quality of Insurance Intermediary Services:An Analysis of Conduct and Performance inthe German Market of Insurance Intermediation[R].Working Paper,2006.
[6]Gabaix X.,D.Laibson.Shrouded Attributes,Consumer Myopia,and Information Suppression in Competi-tive Markets[J].Quarterly Journal of Economics,2006,121(2):505-540.
[7]Harrington.Operating Expenses for Agency and Nonagency Life Insurers:Further Evidence[J].The Jour-nal of Risk and Insurance,1982,49(2):229-255.
[8]Inderst R.,M.Ottaviani.Misselling Through Agents[J].The American Economic Review,2009,99(3),883-908.
[9]Ignatius J.,Frank M.,Neil Q.Agency Contracts with Long-term Customer Relationships[J].Journal ofLabor Economics,2005,23(3):589-608.
[10]James C.,Paula C.,Mark L.Commitment and Insurance Agents’Job Perceptions,Attitudes,and Per-formance[J].The Journal of Risk and Insurance,1993,60(3):363-384.
[11]Klock,Bonham.Life Insurance Agents and Executives:A Test of Incongruent Perceptions[J].The Jour-nal of Risk and Insurance,1974,41(2):249-257.
[12]Puelz,Snow.Efficient Contracting in a Market for Life Insurance Agents with Asymmetric Information[J].The Journal of Risk and Insurance,1991,58(4):729-736.
[13]Regan L.,Tennyson.Agent Discretion and the Choice of Insurance Marketing System[J].Journal of Lawand Economics,1996,39(2):637-666.
[14]Tumer,James H.An Analysis of Factors Affecting Life Insurance Agent’s Sale Performance[J].Academyof Marketing Studies Journal,2008,12(1):1-10.
引用本文
刘玉焕, 邵全权. 营销员规模、佣金成本与寿险经营绩效[J]. 上海财经大学学报, 2013, 15(4): 67–74.
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