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【With the same author name:【Zhao Guoyu】 Found 4 articles】 /Page Order by: Asce Desc

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CORPORATE GOVERNANCE | F270

Does D&O Insurance Promote Enterprise Innovation? Based on the Perspective of Credit Rent-seeking and Financing Constraints

Zhao Guoyu, Liang Huiping

Innovation cannot be achieved without external financial support. However, innovation activities are often trapped in the predicament of financing constraints and credit rent-seeking, whic...

First published at: Mar 20, 2022

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doi:10.16538/j.cnki.fem.20210921.201

Foreign Economics & Management, Vol. 44, Issue 03, pp. 103 - 117

| F270

Will CEOs Profit from Multiple Major Shareholders’ Equity Balance? Empirical Evidence from CEO Overcompensation

This paper analyzes the cost of the corporate governance of multiple major shareholders from the perspective of executive overcompensation. Based on the data of Chinese listed companies fr...

First published at: Aug 01, 2019

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doi:10.16538/j.cnki.fem.2019.08.010

Foreign Economics & Management, Vol. 41, Issue 08, pp. 126 - 139

| F270

The Corporate Governance Effect of Large Shareholders’ Equity Balance: Evidence from Private Listed Companies

Zhao Guoyu, Yu Wei

This paper studies the influence of equity balance on the performance of the company from two aspects of investment efficiency promotion and large shareholders’ hollowing down. On this ba...

First published at: Nov 01, 2018

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doi:10.16538/j.cnki.fem.2018.11.005

Foreign Economics & Management, Vol. 40, Issue 11, pp. 60 - 72

| F270

Controlling Shareholders, Compensation Contracts and Tunneling in Collusion: Evidence from Private Listed Companies

The participation of senior managers in collusion is the necessary link for the tunneling of large shareholders. However, whether executives are willing to collude with large shareholders ...

First published at: Jul 01, 2017

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doi:10.16538/j.cnki.fem.2017.07.008

Foreign Economics & Management, Vol. 39, Issue 07, pp. 105 - 117

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