5132 
6130鉴于债务市场与股票市场的联动效应，文章基于双重差分模型，采用中国人民银行取消贷款利率上下限的准自然实验，以1999−2015中国A股上市公司为样本，结合银行债权治理考察了放松利率管制对股价崩盘风险的抑制效应。结果显示，放松利率管制有助于降低公司未来的股价崩盘风险，特别是非国有公司。进一步研究发现，放松利率管制能够增进银行债权对股价崩盘风险的相机治理功效，且这种积极作用在长期贷款的监督中更加明显。此外，银行信贷意愿、公司信息稳健性和投资效率的路径分析也支持放松利率管制对股价崩盘风险具有抑制效应。文章不仅从银行合约利率视角为治理股价崩盘风险提供了新的证据，还借助放松利率管制这一外生事件验证了银行大贷款人具有稳定股市的经济效应，对于新时代我国有序推进利率市场化和防控金融风险具有重要启示。
放松利率管制、银行债权治理与股价崩盘风险——基于中央银行取消贷款利率上下限的准自然实验
摘要
参考文献
3 郭瑾,刘志远,彭涛. 银行贷款对企业风险承担的影响:推动还是抑制?[J]. 会计研究,2017,(2):42−48. DOI:10.3969/j.issn.1003-2886.2017.02.007
4 胡晖,张璐. 利率市场化对成长型企业融资约束的影响−基于对中小板企业的研究[J]. 经济评论,2015,(5):141−153. DOI:10.3969/j.issn.1003-4919.2015.05.024
11 卢太平,张东旭. 融资需求、融资约束与盈余管理[J]. 会计研究,2014,(1):35−41. DOI:10.3969/j.issn.1003-2886.2014.01.006
12 马弘, 郭于玮. 利率市场化与信贷歧视−基于2004年贷款利率改革的倍差法检验[R]. 经济研究工作论文, 2016.
16 王满四,邵国良. 银行债权的公司治理效应研究−基于广东上市公司的实证分析[J]. 会计研究,2012,(11):49−56. DOI:10.3969/j.issn.1003-2886.2012.11.007
23 An H,Zhang T. Stock price synchronicity,crash risk,and institutional investors[J]. Journal of Corporate Finance,2013,21: 1−15. DOI:10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2013.01.001
24 Baginski S P,Campbell J L,Hinson L A,et al. Do career concerns affect the delay of bad news disclosure?[J]. The Accounting Review,2018,93(2): 61−95. DOI:10.2308/accr-51848
27 Jensen M C,Meckling W H. Theory of the firm:Managerial behavior,agency costs and ownership structure[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1976,3(4): 305−360. DOI:10.1016/0304-405X(76)90026-X
28 Jin L,Myers S C. R2 around the world:New theory and new tests[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2006,79(2): 257−292. DOI:10.1016/j.jfineco.2004.11.003
29 Khan M,Watts R L. Estimation and empirical properties of a firm-year measure of accounting conservatism[J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics,2009,48(2−3): 132−150. DOI:10.1016/j.jacceco.2009.08.002
30 Kim J B,Li Y H,Zhang L D. CFOs versus CEOs:Equity incentives and crashes[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2011a,101(3): 713−730. DOI:10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.03.013
31 Kim J B,Li Y H,Zhang L D. Corporate tax avoidance and stock price crash risk:Firm-level analysis[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2011b,100(3): 639−662. DOI:10.1016/j.jfineco.2010.07.007
32 Kim J B,Wang Z,Zhang L D. CEO overconfidence and stock price crash risk[J]. Contemporary Accounting Research,2016,33(4): 1720−1749. DOI:10.1111/1911-3846.12217
33 Kim J B,Zhang L D. Financial reporting opacity and expected crash risk:Evidence from implied volatility smirks[J]. Contemporary Accounting Research,2014,31(3): 851−875. DOI:10.1111/1911-3846.12048
34 Kothari S P,Shu S S,Wysocki P D. Do managers withhold bad news?[J]. Journal of Accounting Research,2009,47(1): 241−276. DOI:10.1111/j.1475-679X.2008.00318.x
35 LaFond R,Watts R L. The information role of conservatism[J]. The Accounting Review,2008,83(2): 447−478. DOI:10.2308/accr.2008.83.2.447
36 Lin C,Ma Y,Malatesta P,et al. Corporate ownership structure and the choice between bank debt and public debt[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2013,109(2): 517−534. DOI:10.1016/j.jfineco.2013.03.006
37 Minnis M,Sutherland A. Financial statements as monitoring mechanisms:Evidence from small commercial loans[J]. Journal of Accounting Research,2017,55(1): 197−233. DOI:10.1111/1475-679X.12127
38 Myers S C. Determinants of corporate borrowing[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1977,5(2): 147−175. DOI:10.1016/0304-405X(77)90015-0
39 Piotroski J D,Wong T J,Zhang T Y. Political incentives to suppress negative information:Evidence from Chinese listed firms[J]. Journal of Accounting Research,2015,53(2): 405−459. DOI:10.1111/1475-679X.12071
40 Richardson S. Over-investment of free cash flow[J]. Review of Accounting Studies,2006,11(2−3): 159−189. DOI:10.1007/s11142-006-9012-1
42 Shaw E S. Financial deepening in economic development[M]. New York: Oxford University Press, 1973.
引用本文
鄢翔, 耀友福. 放松利率管制、银行债权治理与股价崩盘风险——基于中央银行取消贷款利率上下限的准自然实验[J]. 财经研究, 2020, 46(3): 19-33.
导出参考文献，格式为：
上一篇：数字金融发展与企业“脱虚向实”
