4093 
2592“党建入章”旨在企业通过将党建写入公司章程来实现其基层党组织对公司治理的有效参与。文章手工搜集了2007—2019年中国A股上市公司的公司章程数据，通过构建“党建入章”数据库实证检验了“党建入章”这一基层党组织的制度安排对企业财务舞弊行为的潜在影响。研究发现：“党建入章”能够抑制企业财务舞弊行为，这种舞弊治理作用在企业国有产权比例较高时更加凸显；渠道分析发现，“党建入章”对企业财务舞弊行为的抑制作用能够通过强化企业内部控制制度有效性得以实现；异质性分析表明，“党建入章”对企业财务舞弊行为的抑制作用在双向进入程度较强、外部监督（如审计师、分析师关注以及监管距离）相对较弱时更加明显。文章从企业财务舞弊治理的角度证明了“党建入章”对完善企业监督机制、提升公司治理效率的积极效果，既为国有企业“党建入章”这一制度安排的合理性和必要性奠定了理论基础，也为继续完善党组织嵌入公司治理的实践思路提供了政策启示。
“党建入章”、国有产权与企业财务舞弊
摘要
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引用本文
修宗峰, 顾宇鹏, 殷敬伟. “党建入章”、国有产权与企业财务舞弊[J]. 上海财经大学学报, 2022, 24(4): 93-107.
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