[1]Chen Deqiu, Zhong Yunjia. Institutional efficiency, family-based routes and family investment preference[J]. Journal of Finance and Economics, 2011, 37(12):107-117.
[2]Chen Zhibin, Wu Min, Chen Zhihong. The paths where paternalistic management influencing value of small and medium-sized family enterprises:Research on agency theory and efficiency theory based on industrial competition[J]. China Industrial Economics, 2017, (5):113-132.
[3]Dou Junsheng, Wu Saisai. A literature review of long-term orientation in family business and prospects[J]. Business Management Journal, 2019, 41(6):194-208.
[4]Fang Mingyue. Market competition, financial constraint, and trade credit:Evidence from China manufacturing firms[J]. Journal of Financial Research, 2014, (2):111-124.
[5]Feng Hua, Sun Yan. Human resource of family business and lifecycle[J]. Reform, 2009, (6):135-141.
[6]Gu Shengzu, Zhang Zhaohua. Governance of family businesses and its model selection[J]. Chinese Journal of Population Science, 2006, (1):33-41.
[7]Hu Nan, Xue Fujing, Wang Haonan. Does managerial myopia affect long-term investment? Based on text analysis and machine learning[J]. Management World, 2021, 37(5):139-156.
[8]Huang Yue, Yang Naiding, Zhang Chenlu. Influence of the top management team heterogeneity and the firm performance:To focus on ownership concentration[J]. Management Review, 2011, 23(11):120-125.
[9]LiHuan, Zheng Gaoping, Xu Yongxin. Professionalization in family firms and firm value:Evidence from Chinese listed family firms[J]. Journal of Financial Research, 2014, (11):127-141.
[10]Li Jing, He Xiaogang. Family authority in TMT and innovation: An empirical study in Chinese family-owned firms[J]. Chinese Journal of Management, 2012, 9(9):1314-1322.
[11]Li Shengnan, Niu Jianbo. A review of managerial power research and the construction of general framework[J]. Foreign Economics & Management, 2014, 36(7):3-13.
[12]Li Xiaotong, Li Weiwen, Li Xinchun. Bifurcation bias and the competitive advantage of family firms:A theoretical framework[J]. Quarterly Journal of Management, 2020, 5(4):61-85.
[13]Liu Shiyuan, Lin Zhifan, Leng Zhipeng. Whether tax incentives stimulate corporate innovation: Empirical evidence based on corporate life cycle theory[J]. Economic Research Journal, 2020,55(6):105-121.
[14]Lu Dong, Yu Du, Huang Dan, et al. Internal training and external hiring:Who can better promote corporate innovation[J]. China Industrial Economics, 2020, (10):2-19.
[15]Pan Yue, Weng Ruoyu, Ji Xiangge, et al. Clan culture and the blood complex of family firm governance[J]. Management World, 2019, 35(7):116-135.
[16]Tan Qingmei, Su Jiangqi, Ha Liuyu. Family involvement, kinship composition and earnings management[J]. Journal of Industrial Engineering, 2022. 10.13587/j.cnki.jieem.2022.05.009.
[17]Wang Jing, Chen Bo. Does external earnings pressure influence under-investment behavior? Evidence from the listed manufacturing companies in China[J]. Accounting Research, 2014, (3):33-40+95.
[18]Wang Luping, Bai Yinzhuan, Wang Yintian. The effect of equity incentive on investment efficiency:Evidence from listed family firms[J]. Systems Engineering, 2018, 36(8):37-50.
[19]Wen Zhonglin, Zhang Lei, Hou Jietai, et al. Testing and application of the mediating effects[J]. Acta Psychologica Sinica, 2004, 36(5):614-620.
[20]Wu Chaopeng, Xue Nanzhi, Zhang Qi, et al. Familism culture, corporate governance reform and firm performance:Evidence from China's family firms[J]. Economic Research Journal, 2019, 54(2):182-198.
[21]Xu Jin, Zheng Han, Zhao Tingting. Can professionalization of family firms promote firm innovation[J]. Finance & Economics, 2019, (9):63-72.
[22]Xu Xiaoming, Zhou Xuhui. The choice of internal management pattern of private firms on the perspective of management efficiency[J]. Finance & Economics, 2008, (7):64-71.
[23]Yan Ruosen, Wu Mengxi. Second generation involvement, institutional context and innovation investment of Chinese family businesses:Based on the theory of socioemotional wealth[J]. Business and Management Journal, 2020, 42(3):23-39.
[24]Zhong Xi, Ren Liuyang, Ren Ge.“De-Familization”of family enterprises:A view of innovation aspiration gap[J]. Nankai Business Review, 2022, 25(1):177-190.
[25] Zhu Hang, Eric Kushins, Zhou Yinghui. Does social emotional wealth constrain Chinese family firms' innovation investment? [J]. Management World, 2016, (3):99-114.
[26]Zou Likai, Song Lihong, Liang Qiang. Acquired philanthropist:Research on charitable donation of family business in the context of succession[J]. Foreign Economics & Management, 2020,42(3):118-135.
[27] Anderson R C, Duru A, Reeb D M. Investment policy in family controlled firms[J]. Journal of Banking & Finance,2012, 36(6): 1744-1758.
[28] Binacci M, Peruffo E, Oriani R, et al. Are all non-family managers (NFMs) equal? The impact of NFM characteristics and diversity on family firm performance[J]. Corporate Governance:An International Review,2016, 24(6): 569-583.
[29] Chrisman J J, Memili E, Misra K. Nonfamily managers, family firms, and the winner's curse: The influence of noneconomic goals and bounded rationality[J]. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice,2014, 38(5): 1-25.
[30] Chua J H, Chrisman J J, Steier L P, et al. Sources of heterogeneity in family firms: An introduction[J]. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice,2012, 36(6): 1103-1113.
[31] D'Angelo A, Majocchi A, Buck T. External managers, family ownership and the scope of SME internationalization[J]. Journal of World Business,2016, 51(4): 534-547.
[32] Daspit J J, Madison K, Barnett T, et al. The emergence of bifurcation bias from unbalanced families: Examining HR practices in the family firm using circumplex theory[J]. Human Resource Management Review,2018, 28(1): 18-32.
[33] Finkelstein S. Power in top management teams: Dimensions, measurement, and validation[J]. Academy of Management Journal,1992, 35(3): 505-538.
[34] García-Sánchez I M, Martínez-Ferrero J, García-Meca E. Does family involvement monitor external CEOs’ investment decisions?[J]. Review of Managerial Science,2020, 14(1): 159-192.
[35] Gómez-Mejía L R, Haynes K T, Núñez-Nickel M, et al. Socioemotional wealth and business risks in family-controlled firms: Evidence from spanish olive oil mills[J]. Administrative Science Quarterly,2007, 52(1): 106-137.
[36] Madison K, Daspit J J, Turner K, et al. Family firm human resource practices: Investigating the effects of professionalization and bifurcation bias on performance[J]. Journal of Business Research,2018, 84: 327-336.
[37] Miller D, Le Breton-Miller I, Minichilli A, et al. When do non-family CEOs outperform in family firms? Agency and behavioural agency perspectives[J]. Journal of Management Studies,2014, 51(4): 547-572.
[38] Miller D, Le Breton-Miller I. Deconstructing socioemotional wealth[J]. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice,2014, 38(4): 713-720.
[39] Patel P C, Cooper D. Structural power equality between family and non-family TMT members and the performance of family firms[J]. Academy of Management Journal,2014, 57(6): 1624-1649.
[40] Rosecká N, Machek O. Non-family members and conflict processes in family firms: A systematic review of literature[J]. Journal of Business Economics,2022, 92(2): 235-281.
[41] Vandekerkhof P, Steijvers T, Hendriks W, et al. The effect of organizational characteristics on the appointment of nonfamily managers in private family firms: The moderating role of socioemotional wealth[J]. Family Business Review,2015, 28(2): 104-122.
[42] Verbeke A, Kano L. The transaction cost economics theory of the family firm: Family–based human asset specificity and the bifurcation bias[J]. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice,2012, 36(6): 1183-1205.
[43] Waterwall B, Alipour K K. Nonfamily employees’ perceptions of treatment in family businesses: Implications for organizational attraction, job pursuit intentions, work attitudes, and turnover intentions[J]. Journal of Family Business Strategy,2021, 12(3): 100387.