中国上市公司普遍存在的关系型交易模式对资本市场的运行机制和信息中介的行为模式产生了重要影响。文章采用2001—2012年沪深A股全部上市公司作为研究样本,通过文本分析技术从上市公司年报中获取交易网络结构的信息,对关系网络如何影响公司的审计费用和盈余质量进行实证检验。研究结果表明,上市公司的关系网络规模越大,则审计费用越高。尤其对于公司所在省份内部的关系网络和所在行业外部的关系网络,其审计溢价效应更为明显,且发现同一地区和同一行业的关系网络对盈余质量具有正向影响。进一步的横截面分析表明,公司所处的外部信息环境的改善能够增强关系网络对审计费用和盈余质量的正向影响。文章为上市公司的关系网络如何影响事务所的审计活动提供了经验证据,补充了关系型交易模式下审计行为研究的相关文献。
上市公司的关系网络和事务所审计行为——基于公司年报文本分析的经验证据
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引用本文
武凯文. 上市公司的关系网络和事务所审计行为——基于公司年报文本分析的经验证据[J]. 上海财经大学学报, 2019, 21(3): 74-90.
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