8288 
5262法经济学至今已经走过了近半个世纪，法经济学的发展不仅表现为经济学与法学的跨学科交融和经济学的研究范式对传统法学的巨大冲击与整合，也表现为其对司法实践的重要影响。文章通过对这一研究领域文献资料的整理，梳理出了学科发展的理论脉络和演化逻辑，可以为国内研究者的法经济学规范化和本土化的理论探索提供线索。首先，文章在对法经济学理论与实践的回顾与总结基础上，对该学科的性质、基本理论及研究方法做一简单的描述与总结；然后，选择法经济学研究中最重要且最受关注的财产、合同、侵权及犯罪四个领域，对其国内外研究现状，尤其对20世纪80年代后，国内学者对法经济学在中国的本土化研究加以详细的梳理与评述；最后，在对法经济学的成就与不足的总结与评述基础上，结合20世纪90年代后法经济学的学科演变趋势，提出了对法经济学未来发展趋势的基本判断。
法经济学:法学和经济学半个世纪的学科交叉和融合发展
摘要
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史晋川, 吴晓露. 法经济学:法学和经济学半个世纪的学科交叉和融合发展[J]. 财经研究, 2016, 42(10): 50–79.
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