信息成本与企业家的融资决策
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财经研究 2007 年 第 33 卷第 02 期, 页码：133 - 144
摘要
参考文献
摘要
在项目的融资过程中,企业家可能面临两种选择:非市场融资与市场融资。尽管信息不对称是非市场融资的主要约束,但是市场融资可以改善彼此的信息结构。文章分析了企业家(内部人)与投资者(外部人)在不同信息结构下的不完全金融合同。分析后发现,投资者可以榨取的信息租与企业家的信息披露成本构成两种融资方式的主要融资成本;而项目所需的外部资本以及资本市场要求的回报率构成了企业家融资决策的决定性元素。事实上,若项目所需的外部资本越高,信息披露成本越低,市场融资要求的回报率越低和信息租越高,则企业家越有可能选择市场融资;反之,企业家可能选择非市场融资。此外,合谋与私人收益的存在也可能影响到企业家的融资决策。
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[3]Bolton P,D Scharfstein.A theory of predation based on agency problems in financialcontracting[J].American Economic Review,1990,80:94~106.
[4]Bolton P,D Scharfstein.Optimal debt structure and the number of creditors[J].Jour-nal of Political Economy,1996,104.
[5]Diamond D.Financial intermediation and delegated monitoring[J].Review of Econom-ics Studies,1984,51:393~414.
[6]Gale D,M Hellwig.Incentive-compatible debt contracts:The one-period problem[J].Review of Economics Studies,1985,52:647~663.
[7]Hart O,J Moore.Default and renegotiation:A Dynamic model of debt[R].MITWorking Paper,1989,No.520.
[8]Hart O,J Moore.A theory of debt based on the inalienability of human capital[J].Quarterly Journal of Economics,1994,109:841~879.
[9]Hart O,J Moore.Default and renegotiation:A dynamic model of debt[J].QuarterlyJournal of Economics,1998,113:1~41.
[10]Hart O J Moore.Foundations of incomplete contracts[J].Review of Economic Stud-ies,1999,66:115~138.
[11]Hart O,Financial contracting[J].Journal of Economic Literature,2001:1079~1100.
[12]Maskin E,J Tirole.Unforeseen contingencies and incomplete contracts[J].Review ofEconomic Studies,1999,66:83~114.
[13]Modigliani Franco,Merton H Miller.The cost of capital,corporation finance and thetheory of investment[J].American economics Review,1958,48:147~175.
[14]Myers S,N Majluf.Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have informa-tion that investors do not have[J].Journal of Finance Economics,1984,13:187~221.
[15]Townsend R.Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification[J].Journal of Economic Theory,1978,21:265~293.
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燕志雄, 费方域. 信息成本与企业家的融资决策[J]. 财经研究, 2007, 33(2): 133–144.
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