财政分权与地方政府支出结构偏向——基于中国省级面板数据的研究
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上海财经大学学报 2007 年 第 09 卷第 05 期, 页码：77 - 84
摘要
参考文献
摘要
在上级政府对下级政府拥有人事任免权,并以GDP的增长作为考核标准的政治体制下,我国的财政支出分权导致地方政府偏好于经济建设支出和除文教科卫之外的其他部门事业费的支出,而最能反映一个地区居民需求的科教文卫支出则无疑被忽视,甚至被其他支出所挤占。收入分配所产生的激励作用在经济建设的投入上,也是最明显,但它似乎并不能降低行政管理费用的支出,而且,倾向于地方政府的收入分配也不能使地方政府在支出中将更多的部分用于科教文卫。
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[17]Mauro.Corruption and the comopition of Government Expenditure[J].Journal of Public economics,1998,(69):263~279.
引用本文
李婉. 财政分权与地方政府支出结构偏向——基于中国省级面板数据的研究[J]. 上海财经大学学报, 2007, 9(5): 77–84.
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