民营企业利益侵夺倾向与控制权收购模式选择
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上海财经大学学报 2013 年 第 15 卷第 04 期, 页码：91 - 98
摘要
参考文献
摘要
控制权收购可分为一次性收购和循序收购两种模式。文章认为循序收购可被归结为防御机制,这种防御机制旨在发现和约束那些可能对中小股东构成利益侵夺的收购方。文章在对1998-2006年中国A股市场发生的民营企业作为收购方的上市公司控制权收购案例进行研究后,发现具有潜在利益侵夺倾向的收购方更有可能选择循序收购而非一次性收购。这一发现将对公司治理中控股股东与其他中小股东利益冲突的研究从事后阶段推向了事前阶段。
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[5]樊纲,王小鲁,朱恒鹏.中国市场化指数:各地区市场化相对进程2009年报告[M].北京:经济科学出版社,2010.
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[7]Casciaro T.,Piskorski M.J.Power Imbalance,Mutual Dependence,and Constraint Absorption:ResourceDependence Theory Revisited[J].Administrative Science Quarterly,2005,50(2):167-199.
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[9]Claessens S.,Djankov S.,Lang L.The Separation of Ownership and Control in East Asian Corporations[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2000,58(1-2):81-112.
[10]Claessens S.,Djankov S.,Lang L.Disentangling the Incentive and Entrenchment Effects of Large Share-holdings[J].Journal of Finance,2002,57(6):2741-2771.
[11]Dharwadkar R.,George G.,Brandes P.Privatization in Emerging Economies:An Agency Theory Per-spective[J].Academy of Management Review,2000,25(3):650-669.
[12]Haunschild P.R.,Miner A.S.Modes of Inter-organizational Imitation:The Effects of Salience and Un-certainty[J].Administrative Science Quarterly,1997,42(3):472-500.
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[14]La Porta R.,Lopez-de-Silanes F.,Shleifer A.Corporate Ownership Around the World[J].Journal of Fi-nance,1999,54(2):471-517.
[15]La Porta R.,Lopez-de-Silanes F.,Shleifer A.,Vishny R.W.Investor Protection and Corporate Govern-ance[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2000,58(1-2):3-27.
[16]La Porta R.,Lopez-de-Silanes F.,Shleifer A.,Vishny R.W.Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation[J].Journal of Finance,2002,57(3):1147-1170.
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[18]Su Y.Y.,Xu D.,Phan P.H.Principal-principal Conflict in the Governance of the Chinese Public Corpo-ration[J].Management and Organization Review,2008,4(1):17-38.
[19]Xu D.,Zhou C.,Phan P.H.A real Options Perspective on Sequential Acquisitions in China[J].Journal ofInternational Business Studies,2010,41(1):166-174.
[20]Young M.N.,Peng M.W.,Ahlstrom D.,Bruton G.D.,Jiang Y.Corporate Governance in EmergingEconomies:A Review of the Principal-principal Perspective[J].Journal of Management Studies,2008,45(1):196-220.
引用本文
于鸣, 汪金爱. 民营企业利益侵夺倾向与控制权收购模式选择[J]. 上海财经大学学报, 2013, 15(4): 91–98.
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