国外团体贷款激励研究述评
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外国经济与管理 2012 年 第 34 卷第 04 期, 页码：11 - 18
摘要
参考文献
摘要
信息不对称以及担保和抵押缺失,是造成低收入群体和小微型企业融资困难的主要原因。微型金融团体贷款不仅解决了低收入群体和小微型企业融资难的问题,而且还实现了极高的还贷率。国外经济学者纷纷运用信息经济学理论、契约理论和博弈论来分析团体贷款激励机制克服或缓解逆向选择与道德风险问题,以及提高还款率、降低交易成本和放松信贷约束的机理。本文对相关理论研究进行了比较系统的梳理,理清了团体贷款激励理论研究的发展脉络和基本框架,最后在肯定现有研究理论贡献的同时指出了仍存在的不足,并对未来相关研究进行了简要展望。
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[2]Armendáriz B.On the design of a credit agreement with peer monitoring[J].Journal of Development Economics,1999,60(1):79-104.
[3]Armendáriz B and Morduch J.Microfinance beyond group lending[J].Economics of Transition,2000,8(2):401-420.
[4]Armendáriz B and Morduch J.The economics of microfinance[M].Cambridge,MA:MIT Press,2005.
[5]Banerjee A V,et al.Thy neighbor’s keeper:The design of a credit cooperative with theory and a test[J].Quarterly Jour-nal of Economics,1994,109(2):491-515.
[6]Besley T J and Coate S.Group lending,repayment incentives and social collateral[J].Journal of Development Economics,1995,46(1):1-18.
[7]Bolton P and Scharfestein D.A theory of predation based on agency problems in financial contracting[J].American Eco-nomic Review,1990,80(1),93-106.
[8]Cason T N,et al.Moral hazard and peer monitoring in labora-tory microfinance experiment[R].Working Paper No.1208,Institute for Research in the Behavioral,Economic,and Ma-nagement Sciences,Krannert School of Management,Purdue University,Indiana,2008.
[9]Chowdhury R P.Group lending:Sequential financing,lender monitoring and joint liability[J].Journal of Development Eco-nomics,2005,77(2):415-439.
[10]Chowdhury R P.Group lending with sequential financing,contingent renewal and social capital[J].Journal of Develop-ment Economics,2007,84(1):487-506.
[11]Conning J.Outreach,sustainability and leverage in moni-tored and peer-monitored lending[J].Journal of Development Economics,1999,60(1):51-77.
[12]Freixas X and Rochet J-C.Microeconomics of banking[M].Cambridge,MA:MIT Press,2005.
[13]Ghatak M and Guinnane T W.The economics of lending with joint liability:Theory and practice[J].Journal of Development Economics,1999,60(2):195-228.
[14]Ghatak M.Group lending,local information and peer selec-tion[J].Journal of Development Economics,1999,60(1):27-50.
[15]Ghatak M.Screening by the company you keep:joint liability lending and the peer selection effect[J].Economic Journal,2000,110(4):601-631.
[16]Guttman J M.Assortative matching,adverse selection,and group lending[J].Journal of Development Economics,2008,87(1):51-56.
[17]Hermes N and Lensink R.The empirics of microfinance:What do we know?[J].Economic Journal,2007,117(7):F1-F10.
[18]Impavido G.Credit rationing,group lending and optimal group size[J].Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics,1998,69(2):243-260.
[19]Laffont J-J and N’Guessan T.Group lending with adverse selection[J].European Economic Review,2000,44(4/6):773-784.
[20]Morduch J.Does microfinance really help the poor?New evi-dence from flagship programs in Bangladesh[R].Working Paper,ECARES,Princeton University,Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs,Research Program in Development Studies,1998.櫒櫒櫒櫒櫒櫒櫒櫒櫒櫒櫒櫒櫒櫒櫒櫒櫒櫒櫒櫒櫒櫒櫒
[21]Morduch J.The role of subsidies in microfinance:Evidence from the Grameen Bank[J].Journal of Development Eco-nomics,1999a,60(1):229-248.
[22]Morduch J.The mcrofinance promise[J].Journal of Eco-nomic Literature,1999b,37(4):1569-1614.
[23]Morduch J.The microfinance schism[J].World Develop-ment,2000,28(4),617-629.
[24]Park A and Ren C.Microfinance with Chinese characteristics[J].World Development,2001,29(1):39-62.
[25]Stiglitz J E.Peer monitoring and credit markets[J].World Bank Review,1990,4(3):351-366.
[26]Van Tassel E.Group lending under asymmetric information[J].Journal of Development Economics,1999,60(1):3-25.
[27]Van Tassel E.A study of group lending incentives in Bolivia[J].International Journal of Social Economics,2000,27(7/10):927-943.
[28]Zhang W.Ex-ante moral hazard and repayment performance under group lending[J].Journal of East Asian Studies(Ja-pan),2008a,6(1):145-171.
[29]Zhang W.Group lending with adverse selection[J].Interna-tional Economics and Finance Journal,2009,4(1/2):33-58.
[30]Zhang W.China’s non-governmental microcredit sector:History and challenges[J].Journal of Family and Economic Issues,2010,31(3):280-296.
引用本文
张伟, 刘兴坤. 国外团体贷款激励研究述评[J]. 外国经济与管理, 2012, 34(4): 11–18.
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