控制权私利、公司业绩与CEO变更——兼评上市公司内部治理机制的效率
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财经研究 2010 年 第 36 卷第 10 期, 页码：134 - 144
摘要
参考文献
摘要
文章在理论分析的基础上,提出大股东控制框架下CEO变更的五大假设,并以此为视角,基于上交所上市公司2004-2006年公司治理的实践,在运用Logistic回归模型进行实证检验的基础上,对上市公司内部治理机制的效率进行评价。研究发现:(1)能力假设获得证实,表明内部治理机制治理效应的存在;(2)合谋假设获得支持,大股东控制权私利弱化其对CEO的监督;(3)董事会独立性假设得以证实,且董事会履职倾向保守和谨慎;(4)就现阶段的股权结构而言,大股东的利益协同与利益模糊假设同时获得证实。
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[2]龚玉池.公司绩效与CEO更换[J].经济研究,2001,(10):75-82.
[3]李增泉,余谦,王晓坤.掏空、支持与并购重组——来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J].经济研究,2005,(1):95-105.
[4]沈艺峰,张俊生.ST公司总经理离职情况的实证研究[J].证券市场导报,2001,(9):23-27.
[5]吴晓晖,娄景辉.独立董事对传统内部治理机制影响的实证研究——基于多元回归模型和Logistic模型的中国证据[J].数量经济技术经济研究,2008,(4):142-152.
[6]叶康涛,陆正飞,张志华.独立董事能否抑制大股东的“掏空”?[J].经济研究,2007,(4):101-111.
[7]张俊生,曾亚敏.董事会特征与总经理变更[J].南开管理评论,2005,(1):16-20.
[8]朱红军.高级管理人员更换与经营业绩[J].经济科学,2004,(4):82-92.
[9]Denis D J,Kruse T A.Managerial discipline and corporate restructuring following per-formance declines[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2000,55:301-325.
[10]Denis D,Sarin A.Ownership structure and top executive turnover[J].Journal of Fi-nancial Economics,1997,45:193-221.
[11]Goyal V K,Park C W.Board leadership structure and CEO turnover[J].Journal ofCorporate Finance,2002,(8):49-66.
[12]Hermalin B,Weisbach M.Endogenously chosen boards of directors and their monito-ring of the CEO[J].American Economics Review,1998,88:96-118.
[13]Huson M R,Malatesta P H,Parrino R.Managerial succession and firm performance[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2004,(4):237-275.
[14]Jensen M.The modern industrial revolution,exit,and the failure of internal controlsystems[J].Journal of Finance,1993,48:831-880.
[15]Kaplan S,B Minton.Appointments of outsiders to Japanese boards:Determinants and im-plications for managers[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1994,36:225-257.
[16]Kato T,C Long.CEO Turnover,firm performance and enterprise reform in China:Evi-dence from new micro data[J].Journal of Comparative Economics,2006,34(4):796-817.
[17]Murphy K,Zimmerman J.Financial performance surrounding CEO turnover[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,1993,16:273-316.
[18]Yukiko.Chief executive turnover and firm performance in Japan[J].Journal of theJapanese and International Economies,1997,(11):2-26.
[19]Warner J B,Watts R L,Wruck K H.Stock prices and top management changes[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1988,20:461-692.
[20]Weisbach M.Outside directors and CEO turnover[J].Journal of Financial Econom-ics,1988,20:431-460.
引用本文
蒋荣, 刘星. 控制权私利、公司业绩与CEO变更——兼评上市公司内部治理机制的效率[J]. 财经研究, 2010, 36(10): 134–144.
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