高管薪酬契约对公司投资行为的影响——基于证券市场非有效视角的分析
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财经研究 2012 年 第 38 卷第 06 期, 页码：70 - 80
摘要
参考文献
摘要
文章基于中国上市公司2004-2010年动态面板数据GMM方法,在证券市场非有效的背景下考察了高管薪酬契约对公司投资行为的影响。研究结果显示,无论是货币薪酬还是高管持股激励,高管薪酬激励和股票错误定价对公司投资行为的影响具有交互作用,股票市场的投机行为会诱使高管为增加从股权激励中得到的收入而更多地投资。同时,这一关系在实际控制人性质不同的企业存在差异。
③该方法的推导过程与理论依据可参见Rhodes-Kropf,Robinson和Viswannathan(2005)。限于篇幅,我们没有把分解托宾Q值的过程和结果列出来,如有需要可来信索取。
[1]陈冬华,梁上坤,蒋德权.不同市场化进程下高管激励契约的成本与选择:货币薪酬与在职消费[J].会计研究,2010,(11):56-64.
[2]连玉君,程建.投资—现金流敏感性:融资约束还是代理成本?[J].财经研究,2007,(2):37-46.
[3]辛清泉,林斌,王彦超.政府控制、经理薪酬与资本投资[J].经济研究,2007,(8):110-122.
[4]Aggarwal R,Samwick A.Empire-builders and shirkers:Investment,firm performance,and managerial incentives[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,2006,12:489-515.
[5]Baker M P,Stein J C,Wurgler J.When does the market matter?Stock prices and the investment of equity dependent firms[J].Quartyerly Journal of Economics,2003,118:969-1006.
[6]Bolton P,Scheinkman J,Xiong W.Executive compensation and short-termite behav-iour in speculative markets[J].Review of Economic Studies,2006,73(3):577-610.
[7]Blundell R,Bond S.Initial conditions and moment restrictions in dynamic panel data models[J].Journal of Econometrics,1998,87:115-143.
[8]Bond S R,Meghir C.Dynamic investment models and the firm’s financial policy[J].Review of Economic Studies,1994,61:197-222.
[9]Grundy B D,Li H.Investor sentiment,executive compensation,and corporate invest-ment[J].Journal of Banking&Finance,2010,34:2439-2449.
[10]Polk C,Sapienza P.The stock market and corporate investment:A test of catering theory[J].Review of Financial Studies,2009,22:187-217.
[11]Roodman D.How to do xtabond2:An introduction to difference and system GMM in stata[R].Washington,Center for Global Development Working Paper,No.103,2006.
[12]Rhodes-Kropf M,Robinson D T,Viswanathan S.Valuation waves and merger activi-ty:The empirical evidence[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2005,77:561-603.
[1]陈冬华,梁上坤,蒋德权.不同市场化进程下高管激励契约的成本与选择:货币薪酬与在职消费[J].会计研究,2010,(11):56-64.
[2]连玉君,程建.投资—现金流敏感性:融资约束还是代理成本?[J].财经研究,2007,(2):37-46.
[3]辛清泉,林斌,王彦超.政府控制、经理薪酬与资本投资[J].经济研究,2007,(8):110-122.
[4]Aggarwal R,Samwick A.Empire-builders and shirkers:Investment,firm performance,and managerial incentives[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,2006,12:489-515.
[5]Baker M P,Stein J C,Wurgler J.When does the market matter?Stock prices and the investment of equity dependent firms[J].Quartyerly Journal of Economics,2003,118:969-1006.
[6]Bolton P,Scheinkman J,Xiong W.Executive compensation and short-termite behav-iour in speculative markets[J].Review of Economic Studies,2006,73(3):577-610.
[7]Blundell R,Bond S.Initial conditions and moment restrictions in dynamic panel data models[J].Journal of Econometrics,1998,87:115-143.
[8]Bond S R,Meghir C.Dynamic investment models and the firm’s financial policy[J].Review of Economic Studies,1994,61:197-222.
[9]Grundy B D,Li H.Investor sentiment,executive compensation,and corporate invest-ment[J].Journal of Banking&Finance,2010,34:2439-2449.
[10]Polk C,Sapienza P.The stock market and corporate investment:A test of catering theory[J].Review of Financial Studies,2009,22:187-217.
[11]Roodman D.How to do xtabond2:An introduction to difference and system GMM in stata[R].Washington,Center for Global Development Working Paper,No.103,2006.
[12]Rhodes-Kropf M,Robinson D T,Viswanathan S.Valuation waves and merger activi-ty:The empirical evidence[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2005,77:561-603.
引用本文
夏冠军, 于研. 高管薪酬契约对公司投资行为的影响——基于证券市场非有效视角的分析[J]. 财经研究, 2012, 38(6): 70–80.
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