2316 
3416平台对低质量商家的治理力度往往低于社会最优水平，导致消费者权益及社会福利受损。为了明晰平台治理策略的选择激励及其影响，文章通过构建博弈模型，分别在寡头市场和垄断市场下分析并比较了平台的治理力度，进一步从政府规制的角度，分析了不同市场环境下的监管策略。研究发现两类产品的质量差异越大，平台治理强度越强。与社会最优相比，平台治理强度存在一定不足，且网络外部性和商品间质量差异的提高会进一步放大两者的差距，因此政府监管力度应随网络外部性和产品质量差异的提高而提高。文章从商家治理的角度丰富了对平台经济的理论探索，细致地刻画了治理强度与网络外部性以及商家质量间的关系。研究结论对平台自我治理策略选择、政府管制力度选择、保障消费者权益及提升社会福利有所启示。
产品质量、平台治理与政府监管研究
摘要
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引用本文
邹干. 产品质量、平台治理与政府监管研究[J]. 上海财经大学学报, 2021, 23(6): 109-122.
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