尽管围绕家族企业创新的研究已愈发深入,但对于传承背景下的家族企业创新研究结论则尚未清晰,鲜有研究思考创一代后继任者的身份差异对企业创新决策的影响。本文聚焦于家族企业继任CEO的来源差异,以合法性视角分别考察家族二代和职业经理人继任CEO后的创新投入决策,并进一步考察家族所有权类型的情境作用。基于2004—2015年526家上市家族企业的实证检验结果表明:(1)相对于一代创始人CEO,家族二代和职业经理人继任CEO均会降低企业的创新投入承诺。(2)多创始人控制的家族企业一定程度加剧了二代CEO合法性不足所导致的较低创新投入,而单一创始人控制家族企业反而会导致职业经理人CEO更低的创新投入。研究结论表明,在家族企业中,创业者、守业者与经理人不同的身份合法性造成了创新投入承诺的差异性。
继任CEO身份差异与家族企业创新投入研究——基于合法性的视角
摘要
参考文献
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引用本文
邹立凯, 王博, 梁强. 继任CEO身份差异与家族企业创新投入研究——基于合法性的视角[J]. 外国经济与管理, 2019, 41(3): 126-140.
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