4445 
4638首例信息型市场操纵的刑事案件“徐翔案”于2017年判决，具有里程碑意义。与传统的短线操纵不同，信息型市场操纵涉及上市公司与二级市场机构的联合操纵，操纵者利用信息发布与传播，配合公司行动连续交易，联合操纵股价，炒作持续时间更长、影响范围更广，更容易诱使大量资金跟风交易，因而更有可能发生财富转移。由于减持是现阶段上市公司重要股东实现财富转移的主要渠道，文章基于内部人减持视角，系统研究了信息型市场操纵与财富转移的行为特征、动机与经济后果。研究发现，内部人减持期间存在明显的信息操纵迹象，主要方式包括减持前发布“高送转”“业绩预增”“并购重组”等利好信息；操纵的动机是为了精准刺激股价，掩护操纵者高位减持套现，实现财富转移效应最大化；经济后果是企业经营秩序受到严重破坏，产业资本加速脱离实体经济。文章还从减持预谋、反向交易和利好信息的欺诈属性三个维度揭示了上述行为的市场操纵本质。文章为研究资本市场交易行为如何影响实体经济提供了新证据，对于完善上市公司股份减持制度和实现资本市场高质量发展具有重要启示。
信息型市场操纵与财富转移效应研究——基于上市公司内部人减持的视角
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引用本文
徐龙炳, 李琛, 陈倩雯. 信息型市场操纵与财富转移效应研究——基于上市公司内部人减持的视角[J]. 财经研究, 2021, 47(5): 4-18.
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