长任期CEO薪酬现象的理论诠释
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外国经济与管理 2007 年 第 29 卷第 12 期, 页码：43 - 49
摘要
参考文献
摘要
CEO任期的长短显著影响着董事会关于CEO薪酬的决策过程,CEO薪酬的总体水平随着其任期的延长而上升,薪酬体系的设计也日益趋向于迎合CEO的个人偏好。这种长任期CEO薪酬现象,虽然有悖委托代理理论的内在逻辑,但却是一个客观存在的事实。本文试图跳出委托代理理论的窠臼,从人力资本、经理主义和社会心理等视角对长任期CEO薪酬现象进行阐释,揭示导致长任期CEO薪酬现象的深层机理,并且对董事会关于长任期CEO薪酬决策的本真面貌进行还原。
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[5]Dierickx,I,and Cool,K.Asset stock accumulation and sustainability of competitive advantage[J].Management Science,1989,35(12):1 504-1 511.
[6]Amihud,Yakov,and Lev,Baruch.Risk reduction as a managerial motive for conglomerate mergers[J].The Bell Journal of Econom-ics,1981,12(2):605-617.
[7]Hirsch,P M,and Friedman,R.Collaboration or paradigm shift:Economic vs.behavioral thinking about policy[J].Academy ofManagement,1986,5:31-35.
[8]Pfeffer,J.Size and composition of corporate boards of directors:The organization and its environment[J].Administrative ScienceQuarterly,1972,17(2):218-228.
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[20]Conyon,Martin J.Tenure and contracts:The experience of U K CEOs[J].Personnel Review,1994,23(5):25-33.
引用本文
李金早, 许晓明. 长任期CEO薪酬现象的理论诠释[J]. 外国经济与管理, 2007, 29(12): 43–49.
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