交叉上市约束效应研究述评与未来展望——基于法律约束和声誉约束视角
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外国经济与管理 2014 年 第 36 卷第 04 期, 页码：3 - 14
摘要
参考文献
摘要
近十年来,交叉上市约束效应的研究呈现出新的趋势,主要体现为将约束效应进行了法律约束和声誉约束的细分。根据此研究趋势,本文将相关文献分为两类:一类集中探讨交叉上市的法律约束效应,这类研究强调法律制度的合规性,是早期研究的主流;另一类集中探讨交叉上市的声誉约束效应,这类研究重视市场监督的有效性,正在逐步兴起。本文的文献梳理将有助于理解交叉上市约束效应的作用机理,并为今后的研究提供新的思路。
[1]Abdallah W and Goergen M.Does corporate control determine the cross-listing location?[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,2008,14(3):183-199.
[2]Aggarwal R,et al.ADR holdings of US-based emerging market funds[J].Journal of Banking&Finance,2007,31(6):1649-1667.
[3]Arping S and Sautner Z.Did SOX Section 404make firms less opaque:Evidence from cross-Listed firms[J].Contemporary Accounting Research,2013,Forthcoming.
[4]Bailey W,et al.The economic consequences of increased disclosure:Evidence from international cross-Listing[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2006,81(1):175-213.
[5]Boubakri N,et al.The choice of ADRs[J].Journal of Banking&Finance,2010,34(9):2077-2095.
[6]Bradshaw M T,et al.Accounting choice,home bias,and U.S.investment in non-U.S.firms[J].Journal of Accounting Research,2004,42(5):795-841.
[7]Burns N,et al.Cross-listing and legal bonding:Evidence from mergers and acquisitions[J].Journal of Banking&Finance,2007,31(4):1003-1031.
[8]Chan K and Hameed A.Stock price synchronicity and analyst coverage in emerging markets[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2006,80(1):115-147.
[9]Charitou A,et al.Cross-listing,bonding hypothesis and corporate governance[J].Journal of Business Finance&Accounting,2007,34(7-8):1281-1306.
[10]Charitou A and Louca C.Cross-listing and operating performance:Evidence from exchange-listed American depositary receipts[J].Journal of Business Finance&Accounting,2009,36(1-2):99-129.
[11]Chemmanur T J and Fulghieri P.Competition and cooperation among exchanges:A theory of cross-listing and endogenous listing standards[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2006,82(2):455-489.
[12]Choi J,et al.Cross-listing audit fee premiums:Theory and evidence[J].The Accounting Review,2009,84(5):1429-1463.
[13]Coffee J C.The future as history:The prospects for global convergence in corporate governance and its implications[J].Northwes-tern Law Review,1999,93:641-707.
[14]Coffee J C.Racing towards the top?The impact of cross-listings and stock market competition on international corporate governance[J].Columbia Law Review,2002,102(7):1757-1831.
[15]Coffee J C.Law and the market the impact of enforcement[J].University of Pennsylvania Law Review,2007,156:229-311.
[16]Diamond D W.Monitoring and reputation:The choice between bank loans and directly placed debt[J].Journal of Political Econo-my,1991,99(4):689-721.
[17]Doidge C,et al.Why are foreign firms listed in the US worth more?[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2004,71(2):205-238.
[18]Doidge C,et al.Private benefits of control,ownership,and the cross-listing decision[J].The Journal of Finance,2009,64(1):425-466.
[19]Doidge C,et al.Has New York become less competitive than London in global markets?Evaluating foreign listing choices overtime[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2009,91(3):253-277.
[20]Eng L L,et al.Cross-listing,information environment,and market value:Evidence from U.S.firms that list on foreign stock exchanges[J].Journal of International Accounting Research,2008,7(2):25-41.
[21]Fernandes N,et al.Escape from New York:The market impact of loosening disclosure requirements[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2010,95(2):129-147.
[22]Fernandes N and Ferreira M A.Does international cross-listing improve the information environment[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2008,88(2):216-244.
[23]Foucault T and Gehrig T.Stock price informativeness,cross-listings,and investment decisions[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2008,88(1):146-168.
[24]Fre.sard L and Salva C.The value of excess cash and corporate governance:Evidence from US cross-listings[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2010,98(2):359-384.
[25]Gande A and Miller D P.Why do U.S.securities laws matter to non-U.S.firms?Evidence from private class-action lawsuits[J].Working Paper(Southern Methodist University),2011.
[26]Goto S,et al.Strategic disclosure and stock returns:Theory and evidence from US cross-listing[J].The Review of Financial Studies,2009,22(4):1585-1620.
[27]Hail L and Leuz C.Cost of capital effects and changes in growth expectations around U.S.cross-listings[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2009,93(3):428-454.
[28]He H.Are changes in cross-listing in the U.S.from the pre-to post-Sarbanes-Oxley period associated with shareholder protection in foreign firms’home countries?[J].Journal of International Accounting Research,2008,7(2):65-84.
[29]Hope O,et al.Bonding to the improved disclosure environment in the United States:Firms’listing choices and their capital market consequences[J].Journal of Contemporary Accounting and Economics,2007,3(1):1-33.
[30]Huang Y,et al.Investor protection and cash holdings:Evidence from US cross-listing[J].Journal of Banking&Finance,2013,37(3):937-951.
[31]Khanna T,et al.Disclosure practices of foreign companies interacting with US markets[J].Journal of Accounting Research,2004,42(2):475-508.
[32]La Porta R,et al.Law and finance[J].Journal of Political Economy,1998,106(6):1113-1155.
[33]La Porta R,et al.Corporate ownership around the world[J].Journal of Finance,1999,54(2):471-517.
[34]Lang M H,et al.ADRs,analysts,and accuracy:Does cross listing in the United States improve a firm's information environment and increase market value?[J].Journal of Accounting Research,2003,41(2):317-345.
[35]Lang M H,et al.Concentrated control,analyst following,and valuation:Do analysts matter most when investors are protected least[J].Journal of Accounting Research,2004,42(3):589-623.
[36]Lang M H and Lundholm R J.Corporate disclosure policy and analyst behavior[J].The Accounting Review,1996,71(4):467-492.
[37]Lel U and Miller D P.International cross-listing,firm performance,and top management turnover:A test of the bonding hypothesis[J].The Journal of Finance,2008,63(4):1897-1937.
[38]Leuz C,et al.Do foreigners invest less in poorly governed firms?[J].The Review of Financial Studies,2009,22(8):3245-3285.
[39]Licht A N.Cross-listing and corporate governance:Bonding or avoiding?[J].Chicago Journal of International Law,2003,4(3):141-152.
[40]Luo Y,et al.The overseas listing puzzle:Post-IPO performance of Chinese stocks and ADRs in the U.S.market[J].Journal of Multinational Financial Management,2012,22(5):193-211.
[41]Nowland J and Simon A.The effect of a change in analyst composition on analyst forecast accuracy:Evidence from U.S.cross-listings[J].Journal of International Accounting Research,2010,9(1):23-38.
[42]O’Connor T G.Cross-listing in the US and domestic investor protection[J].The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance,2006,46(3):413-436.
[43]Petrasek L.Do transparent firms pay out more cash to shareholders?Evidence from international cross-listings[J].Financial Man-agement,2012,41(3):615-636.
[44]Piotroski J D and Roulstone D T.The influence of analysts,institutional investors and insiders on the incorporation of market,industry and firm-specific information into stock prices[J].The Accounting Review,2004,79(4):1119-1151.
[45]Reese W A and Weisbach M S.Protection of minority shareholder interests,cross-listings in the United States,and subsequent equity offerings[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2002,66(1):65-104.
[46]Roulstone D T.Analyst following and market liquidity[J].Contemporary Accounting Research,2003,20(3):1-27.
[47]Siegel J.Can foreign firms bond themselves effectively by renting U.S.securities laws?[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2005,75(2):319-359.
[48]Stulz R M.Globalization of equity markets and the cost of capital[J].Applied Corporate Finance,1999,12:8-25.
[49]Stulz R M.Globalization,corporate finance,and the cost of capital[J].Journal of Applied Corporate Finance,1999,12(3):8-25.
[50]Stulz R M.Managerial discretion and optimal financing policies[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1990,26(1):3-27.
[51]Wójcik D,et al.Corporate governance and cross-listing:Evidence from european companies[J].Working Paper(University of Oxford),2005.
[52]李维安.海外上市:谨防治理风险累积而触礁[J].南开管理评论,2011(3):1.
[53]李维安,王倩.投资者保护微观效应文献综述:基于影响机制复杂性与结果多样性的新观察[J].南开管理评论,2011,14(6):4-15.
[54]辛清泉,郭磊.交叉上市的约束效应与公司治理相关研究述评[J].现代财经(天津财经大学学报),2012(10):115-122.
[55]邹颖.交叉上市的资本成本效应研究综述——基于绑定假说的视角[J].经济与管理研究,2009(2):38-43.
①由于美国具有较好的投资者保护体制(包括证券法律法规,证券交易委员会的监管以及证券分析师、机构投资者、审计师等声誉媒介的监督等),大部分学者以海外公司在美交叉上市作为研究主题。因此,本文所梳理的文献主题主要为“海外公司在美国交叉上市”。另外,本文所梳理文献主要为来源于“The Journal of Finance”“Journal of Financial Economics”“Journal of Accounting Research”等国际顶尖期刊的70余篇文献。
②文章中用董事会特征(董事会规模、审计委员会成员数量、公司治理委员会存在性、委员会数量);董事会和审计委员会独立性(外部董事比例、董事激励计划、审计委员会独立性);CEO对董事会的影响(CEO与董事会主席两职兼任、CEO是否参与委员会、CEO是否参与审计委员会);股权特征(控股股东投票权、外部股东比例、是否二元股权结构)等来表示公司治理质量,只有“CEO对董事会的影响”中的“CEO与董事会主席两职兼任”变量显著。
③文献利用双层股权方法来度量投票权溢价,即用投票权价格除以现金流权价格来表示。
④12h-6条2007年颁布,具有三个规定:第一,允许按照美国投资者的利益简化终止登记程序;第二,允许终止而不是延缓股票登记及其报告义务;第三,当证券登记者少于300人时,允许公司终止交易法规定的报告义务。
⑤404条要求管理层自我评估和保证财务报告内部控制结构和流程的有效性;要求审计师证明管理层对财务报告内部控制有效性的评定。
[2]Aggarwal R,et al.ADR holdings of US-based emerging market funds[J].Journal of Banking&Finance,2007,31(6):1649-1667.
[3]Arping S and Sautner Z.Did SOX Section 404make firms less opaque:Evidence from cross-Listed firms[J].Contemporary Accounting Research,2013,Forthcoming.
[4]Bailey W,et al.The economic consequences of increased disclosure:Evidence from international cross-Listing[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2006,81(1):175-213.
[5]Boubakri N,et al.The choice of ADRs[J].Journal of Banking&Finance,2010,34(9):2077-2095.
[6]Bradshaw M T,et al.Accounting choice,home bias,and U.S.investment in non-U.S.firms[J].Journal of Accounting Research,2004,42(5):795-841.
[7]Burns N,et al.Cross-listing and legal bonding:Evidence from mergers and acquisitions[J].Journal of Banking&Finance,2007,31(4):1003-1031.
[8]Chan K and Hameed A.Stock price synchronicity and analyst coverage in emerging markets[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2006,80(1):115-147.
[9]Charitou A,et al.Cross-listing,bonding hypothesis and corporate governance[J].Journal of Business Finance&Accounting,2007,34(7-8):1281-1306.
[10]Charitou A and Louca C.Cross-listing and operating performance:Evidence from exchange-listed American depositary receipts[J].Journal of Business Finance&Accounting,2009,36(1-2):99-129.
[11]Chemmanur T J and Fulghieri P.Competition and cooperation among exchanges:A theory of cross-listing and endogenous listing standards[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2006,82(2):455-489.
[12]Choi J,et al.Cross-listing audit fee premiums:Theory and evidence[J].The Accounting Review,2009,84(5):1429-1463.
[13]Coffee J C.The future as history:The prospects for global convergence in corporate governance and its implications[J].Northwes-tern Law Review,1999,93:641-707.
[14]Coffee J C.Racing towards the top?The impact of cross-listings and stock market competition on international corporate governance[J].Columbia Law Review,2002,102(7):1757-1831.
[15]Coffee J C.Law and the market the impact of enforcement[J].University of Pennsylvania Law Review,2007,156:229-311.
[16]Diamond D W.Monitoring and reputation:The choice between bank loans and directly placed debt[J].Journal of Political Econo-my,1991,99(4):689-721.
[17]Doidge C,et al.Why are foreign firms listed in the US worth more?[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2004,71(2):205-238.
[18]Doidge C,et al.Private benefits of control,ownership,and the cross-listing decision[J].The Journal of Finance,2009,64(1):425-466.
[19]Doidge C,et al.Has New York become less competitive than London in global markets?Evaluating foreign listing choices overtime[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2009,91(3):253-277.
[20]Eng L L,et al.Cross-listing,information environment,and market value:Evidence from U.S.firms that list on foreign stock exchanges[J].Journal of International Accounting Research,2008,7(2):25-41.
[21]Fernandes N,et al.Escape from New York:The market impact of loosening disclosure requirements[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2010,95(2):129-147.
[22]Fernandes N and Ferreira M A.Does international cross-listing improve the information environment[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2008,88(2):216-244.
[23]Foucault T and Gehrig T.Stock price informativeness,cross-listings,and investment decisions[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2008,88(1):146-168.
[24]Fre.sard L and Salva C.The value of excess cash and corporate governance:Evidence from US cross-listings[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2010,98(2):359-384.
[25]Gande A and Miller D P.Why do U.S.securities laws matter to non-U.S.firms?Evidence from private class-action lawsuits[J].Working Paper(Southern Methodist University),2011.
[26]Goto S,et al.Strategic disclosure and stock returns:Theory and evidence from US cross-listing[J].The Review of Financial Studies,2009,22(4):1585-1620.
[27]Hail L and Leuz C.Cost of capital effects and changes in growth expectations around U.S.cross-listings[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2009,93(3):428-454.
[28]He H.Are changes in cross-listing in the U.S.from the pre-to post-Sarbanes-Oxley period associated with shareholder protection in foreign firms’home countries?[J].Journal of International Accounting Research,2008,7(2):65-84.
[29]Hope O,et al.Bonding to the improved disclosure environment in the United States:Firms’listing choices and their capital market consequences[J].Journal of Contemporary Accounting and Economics,2007,3(1):1-33.
[30]Huang Y,et al.Investor protection and cash holdings:Evidence from US cross-listing[J].Journal of Banking&Finance,2013,37(3):937-951.
[31]Khanna T,et al.Disclosure practices of foreign companies interacting with US markets[J].Journal of Accounting Research,2004,42(2):475-508.
[32]La Porta R,et al.Law and finance[J].Journal of Political Economy,1998,106(6):1113-1155.
[33]La Porta R,et al.Corporate ownership around the world[J].Journal of Finance,1999,54(2):471-517.
[34]Lang M H,et al.ADRs,analysts,and accuracy:Does cross listing in the United States improve a firm's information environment and increase market value?[J].Journal of Accounting Research,2003,41(2):317-345.
[35]Lang M H,et al.Concentrated control,analyst following,and valuation:Do analysts matter most when investors are protected least[J].Journal of Accounting Research,2004,42(3):589-623.
[36]Lang M H and Lundholm R J.Corporate disclosure policy and analyst behavior[J].The Accounting Review,1996,71(4):467-492.
[37]Lel U and Miller D P.International cross-listing,firm performance,and top management turnover:A test of the bonding hypothesis[J].The Journal of Finance,2008,63(4):1897-1937.
[38]Leuz C,et al.Do foreigners invest less in poorly governed firms?[J].The Review of Financial Studies,2009,22(8):3245-3285.
[39]Licht A N.Cross-listing and corporate governance:Bonding or avoiding?[J].Chicago Journal of International Law,2003,4(3):141-152.
[40]Luo Y,et al.The overseas listing puzzle:Post-IPO performance of Chinese stocks and ADRs in the U.S.market[J].Journal of Multinational Financial Management,2012,22(5):193-211.
[41]Nowland J and Simon A.The effect of a change in analyst composition on analyst forecast accuracy:Evidence from U.S.cross-listings[J].Journal of International Accounting Research,2010,9(1):23-38.
[42]O’Connor T G.Cross-listing in the US and domestic investor protection[J].The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance,2006,46(3):413-436.
[43]Petrasek L.Do transparent firms pay out more cash to shareholders?Evidence from international cross-listings[J].Financial Man-agement,2012,41(3):615-636.
[44]Piotroski J D and Roulstone D T.The influence of analysts,institutional investors and insiders on the incorporation of market,industry and firm-specific information into stock prices[J].The Accounting Review,2004,79(4):1119-1151.
[45]Reese W A and Weisbach M S.Protection of minority shareholder interests,cross-listings in the United States,and subsequent equity offerings[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2002,66(1):65-104.
[46]Roulstone D T.Analyst following and market liquidity[J].Contemporary Accounting Research,2003,20(3):1-27.
[47]Siegel J.Can foreign firms bond themselves effectively by renting U.S.securities laws?[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2005,75(2):319-359.
[48]Stulz R M.Globalization of equity markets and the cost of capital[J].Applied Corporate Finance,1999,12:8-25.
[49]Stulz R M.Globalization,corporate finance,and the cost of capital[J].Journal of Applied Corporate Finance,1999,12(3):8-25.
[50]Stulz R M.Managerial discretion and optimal financing policies[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1990,26(1):3-27.
[51]Wójcik D,et al.Corporate governance and cross-listing:Evidence from european companies[J].Working Paper(University of Oxford),2005.
[52]李维安.海外上市:谨防治理风险累积而触礁[J].南开管理评论,2011(3):1.
[53]李维安,王倩.投资者保护微观效应文献综述:基于影响机制复杂性与结果多样性的新观察[J].南开管理评论,2011,14(6):4-15.
[54]辛清泉,郭磊.交叉上市的约束效应与公司治理相关研究述评[J].现代财经(天津财经大学学报),2012(10):115-122.
[55]邹颖.交叉上市的资本成本效应研究综述——基于绑定假说的视角[J].经济与管理研究,2009(2):38-43.
①由于美国具有较好的投资者保护体制(包括证券法律法规,证券交易委员会的监管以及证券分析师、机构投资者、审计师等声誉媒介的监督等),大部分学者以海外公司在美交叉上市作为研究主题。因此,本文所梳理的文献主题主要为“海外公司在美国交叉上市”。另外,本文所梳理文献主要为来源于“The Journal of Finance”“Journal of Financial Economics”“Journal of Accounting Research”等国际顶尖期刊的70余篇文献。
②文章中用董事会特征(董事会规模、审计委员会成员数量、公司治理委员会存在性、委员会数量);董事会和审计委员会独立性(外部董事比例、董事激励计划、审计委员会独立性);CEO对董事会的影响(CEO与董事会主席两职兼任、CEO是否参与委员会、CEO是否参与审计委员会);股权特征(控股股东投票权、外部股东比例、是否二元股权结构)等来表示公司治理质量,只有“CEO对董事会的影响”中的“CEO与董事会主席两职兼任”变量显著。
③文献利用双层股权方法来度量投票权溢价,即用投票权价格除以现金流权价格来表示。
④12h-6条2007年颁布,具有三个规定:第一,允许按照美国投资者的利益简化终止登记程序;第二,允许终止而不是延缓股票登记及其报告义务;第三,当证券登记者少于300人时,允许公司终止交易法规定的报告义务。
⑤404条要求管理层自我评估和保证财务报告内部控制结构和流程的有效性;要求审计师证明管理层对财务报告内部控制有效性的评定。
引用本文
徐建, 李维安. 交叉上市约束效应研究述评与未来展望——基于法律约束和声誉约束视角[J]. 外国经济与管理, 2014, 36(4): 3–14.
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