参照点契约理论:不完全契约理论的行为与实验拓展
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外国经济与管理 2012 年 第 34 卷第 11 期, 页码：52 - 60
摘要
参考文献
摘要
哈特及其合作者最近几年在契约理论研究中引入了行为分析和实验方法,试图从行为经济学视角考察契约关系,在此基础上提出了参照点契约理论,明确了不完全契约理论的分析范式和发展方向。本文从不完全契约理论的内涵和面临的挑战,以及参照点契约理论的基本思想、简化模型、最新拓展和实验证据等方面阐述了哈特等人的开创性贡献,以期厘清参照点契约理论的演进、创新和未来发展方向。
①关于古典契约理论的最新评述,可参见Bolton和Dewatri-pont(2005)及Shavell(2004)。
②关于机制的作用机理分析,可参见Maskin和Tirole(1999)以及Aghion和Holden(2011)。
③关于不完全契约理论局限性的探讨,可参见Tirole(2009)及Aghion和Holden(2011)。
⑧参照点概念在最近的行为经济学研究中扮演着重要角色。Kahneman等(1986)和Falk等(2006)提供的证据表明,企业与消费者往往以历史价格作为判断交易是否公平的参照点。Hart等人借鉴了这一思想,但不同于上述研究文献,他们假定契约本身就是交易关系的一个参照点。
⑨这里有必要举例说明买卖双方投机报复的内涵与表现形式。仍以婚庆服务为例,买方希望在婚礼前1天最后讨论一下婚礼的注意事项,这本来对卖方来说成本很小,卖方一般会满足买方的这一要求。但如果卖方感到委屈或被伤害,就有可能拒绝,而给买方造成巨大损失。买方则可以通过推迟付款或在其他潜在客户那里败坏卖方声誉等手段来报复卖方。关于契约关系中买卖双方投机报复的更多讨论和例证,可参见Mas(2006)。
[1]Abeler J,et al.Reference points and effort provision[J].American Economic Review,2011,101(2):470-492.
[2]Aghion P,et al.On partial contracting[J].European Econo-mic Review,2002,46(4/5):745-753.
[3]Aghion P and Holden R.Incomplete contracts and the theory of the firm:What have we learned over the past25years[J].Journal of Economic Perspectives,2011,25(2):181-197.
[4]Baker G,et al.Contracting for control[R].Working Paper,Harvard Business School,2006.
[5]Bolton P and Dewatripont M.Contract theory[M].Cam-bridge,MA:MIT Press,2005.
[6]Coase R H.The nature of the firm[J].Economica,1937,4(16):386-405.
[7]Falk A,et al.The behavioral effects of minimum wages[J].Quarterly Journal of Economics,2006,121(4):1347-1381.
[8]Fehr E,et al.Contracts as reference points-Experimental ev-idence[J].American Economic Review,2011a,101(2):493-525.
[9]Fehr E,et al,How do informal agreements and renegotiation shape contractual reference points[R].NBER Working Paper No.17545,2011b.
[10]Fehr E,et al.Contracts,reference points,and competition-behavioral effects of the fundamental transformation[J].Journal of the European Economic Association,2009,7(2/3):561-572.
[11]Grossman S J and Hart O D.The costs and benefits of own-ership:A theory of vertical and lateral integration[J].Journal of Political Economy,1986,94(4):691-719.
[12]Hart O and Holmstrom B.A theory of firm scope[J].Quar-terly Journal of Economics,2010,125(2):483-513.
[13]Hart O and Moore J.Contracts as reference points[J].Quarterly Journal of Economics,2008,123(1):1-48.
[14]Hart O and Moore J.Incomplete contracts and ownership:Some new thoughts[J].American Economic Review,2007,97(2):182-186.
[15]Hart O and Moore J.Property rights and nature of the firm[J].Journal of Political Economy,1990,98(6):1119-1158.
[16]Hart O.Noncontractible investments and reference points[J].NBER Working Paper No.16929,2011.
[17]Hart O.Hold-up,asset ownership,and reference points[J].Quarterly Journal of Economics,2009,124(1):267-300.
[18]Hart O.Reference points and the theory of the firm[J].Economica,2008,75(299):404-411.
[19]Hart O.Firms,contracts,and financial structure[M].Ox-ford:Oxford University Press,1995.
[20]Kahneman D,et al.Fairness as a constraint on profit see-king:Entitlements in the market[J].American Economic Re-view,1986,76(4)728-741.
[21]Klein B.Transaction cost determinants of“Unfair”contrac-tual arrangements[J].American Economic Review,1980,70(2):356-362.
[22]Mas A.Pay,reference points,and police performance[J].Quarterly Journal of Economics,2006,121(3):783-821.
[23]Maskin E.On indescribable contingencies and incomplete contracts[J].European Economic Review,2002,46(4/5):725-733.
[24]Maskin E and Tirole J.Unforeseen contingencies and incom-plete contracts[J].Review of Economic Studies,1999,66(1):83-114.
[25]Rajan R G and Zingales L.Power in a theory of the firm[J].Quarterly Journal of Economics,1998,113(2):387-432.
[26]Shavell S.Foundations of economic analysis of law[M].Cambridge,MA:Harvard University Press,2004.
[27]Simon H.A formal theory of the employment relationship[J].Econometrica,1951,19(3):293-305.
[28]Tirole J.Corporate governance[J].Econometrica,2001,69(1):1-35.
[29]Tirole J.Incomplete contracts:Where do we stand?[J].Econometrica,1999,67(4):741-781.
[30]Tirole J.Cognition and incomplete contracts[J].American Economic Review,2009,99(1):265-294.
[31]Williamson O.Transaction-cost economics:The governance of contractual relations[J].Journal of Law and Economics,1979,22(2):233-261.
[32]李维安等.经理才能、公司治理与契约参照点——中国上市公司高管薪酬决定因素的理论与实证分析[J].南开管理评论,2010,(2):4-15.
[33]杨瑞龙,聂辉华.不完全契约理论:一个综述[J].经济研究,2006,(2):104-115.
②关于机制的作用机理分析,可参见Maskin和Tirole(1999)以及Aghion和Holden(2011)。
③关于不完全契约理论局限性的探讨,可参见Tirole(2009)及Aghion和Holden(2011)。
⑧参照点概念在最近的行为经济学研究中扮演着重要角色。Kahneman等(1986)和Falk等(2006)提供的证据表明,企业与消费者往往以历史价格作为判断交易是否公平的参照点。Hart等人借鉴了这一思想,但不同于上述研究文献,他们假定契约本身就是交易关系的一个参照点。
⑨这里有必要举例说明买卖双方投机报复的内涵与表现形式。仍以婚庆服务为例,买方希望在婚礼前1天最后讨论一下婚礼的注意事项,这本来对卖方来说成本很小,卖方一般会满足买方的这一要求。但如果卖方感到委屈或被伤害,就有可能拒绝,而给买方造成巨大损失。买方则可以通过推迟付款或在其他潜在客户那里败坏卖方声誉等手段来报复卖方。关于契约关系中买卖双方投机报复的更多讨论和例证,可参见Mas(2006)。
[1]Abeler J,et al.Reference points and effort provision[J].American Economic Review,2011,101(2):470-492.
[2]Aghion P,et al.On partial contracting[J].European Econo-mic Review,2002,46(4/5):745-753.
[3]Aghion P and Holden R.Incomplete contracts and the theory of the firm:What have we learned over the past25years[J].Journal of Economic Perspectives,2011,25(2):181-197.
[4]Baker G,et al.Contracting for control[R].Working Paper,Harvard Business School,2006.
[5]Bolton P and Dewatripont M.Contract theory[M].Cam-bridge,MA:MIT Press,2005.
[6]Coase R H.The nature of the firm[J].Economica,1937,4(16):386-405.
[7]Falk A,et al.The behavioral effects of minimum wages[J].Quarterly Journal of Economics,2006,121(4):1347-1381.
[8]Fehr E,et al.Contracts as reference points-Experimental ev-idence[J].American Economic Review,2011a,101(2):493-525.
[9]Fehr E,et al,How do informal agreements and renegotiation shape contractual reference points[R].NBER Working Paper No.17545,2011b.
[10]Fehr E,et al.Contracts,reference points,and competition-behavioral effects of the fundamental transformation[J].Journal of the European Economic Association,2009,7(2/3):561-572.
[11]Grossman S J and Hart O D.The costs and benefits of own-ership:A theory of vertical and lateral integration[J].Journal of Political Economy,1986,94(4):691-719.
[12]Hart O and Holmstrom B.A theory of firm scope[J].Quar-terly Journal of Economics,2010,125(2):483-513.
[13]Hart O and Moore J.Contracts as reference points[J].Quarterly Journal of Economics,2008,123(1):1-48.
[14]Hart O and Moore J.Incomplete contracts and ownership:Some new thoughts[J].American Economic Review,2007,97(2):182-186.
[15]Hart O and Moore J.Property rights and nature of the firm[J].Journal of Political Economy,1990,98(6):1119-1158.
[16]Hart O.Noncontractible investments and reference points[J].NBER Working Paper No.16929,2011.
[17]Hart O.Hold-up,asset ownership,and reference points[J].Quarterly Journal of Economics,2009,124(1):267-300.
[18]Hart O.Reference points and the theory of the firm[J].Economica,2008,75(299):404-411.
[19]Hart O.Firms,contracts,and financial structure[M].Ox-ford:Oxford University Press,1995.
[20]Kahneman D,et al.Fairness as a constraint on profit see-king:Entitlements in the market[J].American Economic Re-view,1986,76(4)728-741.
[21]Klein B.Transaction cost determinants of“Unfair”contrac-tual arrangements[J].American Economic Review,1980,70(2):356-362.
[22]Mas A.Pay,reference points,and police performance[J].Quarterly Journal of Economics,2006,121(3):783-821.
[23]Maskin E.On indescribable contingencies and incomplete contracts[J].European Economic Review,2002,46(4/5):725-733.
[24]Maskin E and Tirole J.Unforeseen contingencies and incom-plete contracts[J].Review of Economic Studies,1999,66(1):83-114.
[25]Rajan R G and Zingales L.Power in a theory of the firm[J].Quarterly Journal of Economics,1998,113(2):387-432.
[26]Shavell S.Foundations of economic analysis of law[M].Cambridge,MA:Harvard University Press,2004.
[27]Simon H.A formal theory of the employment relationship[J].Econometrica,1951,19(3):293-305.
[28]Tirole J.Corporate governance[J].Econometrica,2001,69(1):1-35.
[29]Tirole J.Incomplete contracts:Where do we stand?[J].Econometrica,1999,67(4):741-781.
[30]Tirole J.Cognition and incomplete contracts[J].American Economic Review,2009,99(1):265-294.
[31]Williamson O.Transaction-cost economics:The governance of contractual relations[J].Journal of Law and Economics,1979,22(2):233-261.
[32]李维安等.经理才能、公司治理与契约参照点——中国上市公司高管薪酬决定因素的理论与实证分析[J].南开管理评论,2010,(2):4-15.
[33]杨瑞龙,聂辉华.不完全契约理论:一个综述[J].经济研究,2006,(2):104-115.
引用本文
徐细雄. 参照点契约理论:不完全契约理论的行为与实验拓展[J]. 外国经济与管理, 2012, 34(11): 52–60.
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