Based on an incomplete information dynamic game model, this paper theoretically analyzes the effects of information disclosure and deposit insurance system on systemic risks, and then makes an empirical test by using a panel data of 137 listed commercial banks in 24 countries from 2006 to 2014. It arrives at the following conclusions:firstly, the increase in information disclosure degree in banks helps to reduce financing costs and deposit insurance premiums, leads to the decrease in the correlation between assets of banks, and thereby reduces the systemic risks; secondly, financial stability effects of deposit insurance are not obvious, and the increase in information disclosure degree effectively relieves the moral hazard of deposit insurance system; there is synergistic effect between information disclosure degree and deposit insurance system in the aspect of the reduction in systemic risks. A design of reasonable deposit insurance system, experienced supervision authorities and strict supervision system help to play the restriction role of the market, impose restrictions on the moral hazard of deposit insurance, and thereby maintain the stability of financial system. Therefore, under the background of formal implementation of deposit insurance system, supervision authorities should strengthen information disclosure of banks and optimize the design of deposit insurance to better guard against systemic risks of financial system in China.
Information Disclosure, Deposit Insurance System and Systemic Risks of Banks
Journal of Finance and Economics Vol. 42, Issue 12, pp. 96 - 107 (2016) DOI:10.16538/j.cnki.jfe.2016.12.009
Cite this article
Zhu Bo, Yang Wenhua, Lu Lu. Information Disclosure, Deposit Insurance System and Systemic Risks of Banks[J]. Journal of Finance and Economics, 2016, 42(12): 96–107.