可信性、价值认证和投资银行声誉机制
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财经研究 2007 年 第 33 卷第 09 期, 页码：125 - 135
摘要
参考文献
摘要
文章认为由于"机会主义"和"善意错误"的存在,致使投资银行在价值认证中面临"可信性"问题。文章利用C-F模型,探讨了投资银行声誉对解决"可信性"问题的意义,并通过分析投资银行声誉与发行企业质量、IPO抑价和承销费用之间的关系,发现投资银行声誉机制具有"信号显示"、"价值发现"和"补偿激励"等重要功能。由于没有很好地解决可信性问题,投资银行声誉机制的这些功能在我国基本不存在,因此我国投资银行很难发挥价值认证作用,这是我国证券发行市场有效性不足的一个重要原因。
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[2]Benston G J,Smith C W.A transaction cost approach to the theory of financial inter-mediation[J].Journal of Finance,1976,31:215~231.
[3]Benveniste L M,Spindt P.How investment bankers determine the offer price and allo-cation of new issues[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1989,24:343~361.
[4]Booth J,Smith R.Capital raising,underwriting and the certification process[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1986,15:261~281.
[5]Carter R,Manaster S.Initial public offerings and underwriter reputation[J].Journalof Finance,1990,45:1045~1067.
[6]Chemmanur T,Fulghieri P.Investment bank reputation,information production,andfinancial intermediation[J].Journal of Finance,1994,49:56~77.
[7]Grinbalatt Mark,Chuan Yang Hwang.Signalling and the pricing of new issues[J].The Journal of Finance,1989,44:393~421.
[8]James C.Relationship-specific assets and the pricing of underwriter services[J].Journal of Finance,1992,47:1865~1885.
[9]Leland H,Pyle D.Informational asymmetries,financial structure and financial inter-mediation[J].Journal of Finance,1977,32:371~387.
[10]Meggision W L,Weiss K.Venture capitalist certification in initial public offerings[J].Journal of Finance,1991,46(3):879~901.
[11]Pugel T A,White L J.An empirical analysis of underwriting spread on initial publiccofferings[J].Quarterly Review of Economics and Business,1998,28:6~19.
[12]Puri M.Commercial banks as underwriters:Implications for the going public process[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1999,54:133~163.
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刘江会. 可信性、价值认证和投资银行声誉机制[J]. 财经研究, 2007, 33(9): 125–135.
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