政府效率的空间溢出效应研究
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财经研究 2007 年 第 33 卷第 06 期, 页码：102 - 111
摘要
参考文献
摘要
文章首先选取“税收—公共品”组合,利用数据包络方法分析了1997~2004年我国30个省市地方政府的相对效率;然后在此基础上,运用空间回归计量模型研究了政府效率的空间特征。研究体系结果显示,政府效率具有空间溢出作用,并且这种空间溢出作用还在逐年增强;政府效率在空间上存在着显著的互补效应说明地方政府之间有“邻里模仿”行动。
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[3]Banker R D,Acharnes,W Wcooper.Some models for esti mating technical and scale ineffi-ciencies in data envelopment analysis[J].Management Science,1984,30(9):1078~1092.
[4]Benny Geys.Looking across Borders:Atest of spatial policyinterdependence using lo-cal government efficiency ratings[R].Working Paper,2005.
[5]Besley Ti mothy,Case Anne.Incumbent behaviour:Vote seeking,tax setting and yard-stick competition[J].American Economic Review,1995,85:25~45.
[6]Bilek.Local public choice of school spending some original results fromthe French data[R].Working Paper,Univerit啨de Paris1,2005.
[7]Case Anne,Rosen Harvey.Budget spillovers and fiscal policy interdependence[J].Journal of Public Economics,1993,52:285~307.
[8]Charnes A,cooper W W,Rhodes E.Measuring the efficiency of decision making units[J].European Journal of Operational Research 1978,2(6):429~444.
[9]De Borger B,Kerstens K,Moesen W,Vanneste J.Explaining differences in productive effi-ciency:An applicationto belgian municipalities[J].Public Choice,1994,80(3、4):339~358.
[10]Heyndels B,J Ashworth.Self-serving bias in tax perceptions:Federalismas a sourceof instability[J].Kyklos,2003,56(1):47~68.
[11]Kahneman D,A Tversky.Prospect theory:An analysis of decision under risk[J].Econometrica,1979,47:263~291.
[12]Prieto A,Zofio J.Evaluating effectiveness in public provision of infrastructure and e-quipment:The case of Spanish municipalities[J].Journal of Productivity Analysis,2001,15(1):41~58.
[13]Revelli Frederico.Local taxes,national politics and spatial interactionsin English district e-lection results[J].European Journal of Political Economy,2002,18(2):281~299.
[14]Revelli Frederico.Reaction or interaction?Spatial process identification in multitieredgovernment structures[J].Journal of Urban Economics,2003,53(1):29~53.
[15]Rosen HS,Hines J R.Budget spillovers and fiscal policy interdependence:Evidencefromthe states[J].Journal of Public Economics,1993,52:285~307.
[16]Sandy Freret.Spatial analysis of horizontal fiscal interactions on local public expendi-tures:The French case[R].Working Paper,2006.
[17]Wildasin D E.Nash equilibria in models of fiscal competition[J].Journal of Public E-conomics,1988,35:229~240.
[18]Worthington A.Cost efficiencyin australianlocal government:Acomparative analysisof mathematical programming and econometric approaches[J].Financial Accountingand Management,2000,16(3)201~221.
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