财政联邦制、非正式财政与政府债务——对中国转型经济的规范分析
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财经研究 2007 年 第 33 卷第 02 期, 页码：91 - 100
摘要
参考文献
摘要
财政联邦制的一个潜在消极后果是,地方政府竞相从事高风险投资项目等脱离中央监督的非正式财政活动,从而引起预算软约束,并导致政府债务的积累。如果地方政府都这么做,就会形成“太多而不能惩罚”的局面。文章还探讨了如何通过改变政府行为导向,改善政府治理来避免这类问题的可能性。
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[3]刘尚希.中国财政风险的制度特征:“风险大锅饭”[J].管理世界,2004,(5):33~39.
[4]谭秋成.财政考核、制度租金榨取与乡镇债务[J].中国农村观察,2004,(6):6~11.
[5]魏加宁.中国地方政府债务风险与金融危机[J].商务周刊,2004,(5):10~15.
[6]姚洋,杨雷.制度供给失衡和中国财政分权的后果[J].战略与管理,2003,(3):31~40.
[7]于宁.细解央行再贷款[J].财经,2005,(15):14~19.
[8]Blanchard Olivier,Shleifer,Andrei.Federalism with or without political centralization:China versus Russia[R].NBER Working Paper no.7616,2000.
[9]Cai,Hongbin,Treisman,Daniel.State corroding federalism[J].Journal of Public Eco-nomics,2004,88:819~843.
[10]Dewatripont,Mathius,Roland,Gerard.Soft budget constraints,transition,and finan-cial systems[J].Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics,2000,156:245~60.
[11]Frye,Timothy,Shleifer A.The invisible hand and the grabbing hand[J].American E-conomic Review,1997,87:354~357.
[12]Jin,Hehui,Qian,yinyi,Weingast,Barry.Regional decentralization and fiscal incen-tives:federalism,Chinese Style[J].Journal of Public Economics,2005,89:1719~1742.
[13]Pisauro,Giussepe.Intergovernmental relations and fiscal discipline-between commonsand soft budget constraints[R].IMF Working Paper,wp01/65,2001.
[14]Qian,Yinyi,Weingast,Barry.Federalism as a commitment to preserving market incen-tives[J].Journal of Economic Perspectives,1997,(11):83~92.
[15]Rodden,Jonathan.Fiscal decentralization and challenge of hard budget constraints[M].Cambridge,US,MIT Press,2003.
[16]Weingast,Barry.The theory of comparative federalism and the emergence of economicliberalization in Mexico,China and India[R].Hoover Institute,mimeo,2000.
引用本文
陈健. 财政联邦制、非正式财政与政府债务——对中国转型经济的规范分析[J]. 财经研究, 2007, 33(2): 91–100.
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