上市公司高管股权激励所得税规定与激励效用冲突分析
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财经研究 2010 年 第 36 卷第 09 期, 页码：38 - 48
摘要
参考文献
摘要
文章通过对比分析中美两国公司高管股权激励所得税制度差异,发现中国的所得税规定与股权激励制度的激励效果存在冲突,主要表现为:按工资薪金所得纳税,其超额累进税制导致的高边际税率会影响股权激励效用的发挥;在行权日纳税,过重的税收负担会削弱高管实施股权激励制度的积极性,或迫使高管立即抛售股票来缴税,还容易引发高管的机会主义行为;在行权日纳税还导致股权激励收益与税基不匹配。文章针对我国股权激励税收制度中存在的问题提出相应的建议,以期为进一步完善我国上市公司股权激励税收制度提供参考。
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[2]甘行琼.累进税率的制度经济学分析[J].税务研究,2005,(1):75-77.
[3]杨华,陈晓升.上市公司股权激励理论、法规与实务[M].北京:中国经济出版社,2008.
[4]周建波,孙菊生.经营者股权激励的治理效应研究——来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J].经济研究,2003,(5):74-93.
[5]郑晓玲.美国股票期权激励的经验和启示[J].国际金融研究,2007,(4):32-38.
[6]Smith,Watts.The invest ment opportunity set and corporate financing,dividend,andcompensation policies[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1992,32(3):263-292.
[7]Noe C.Voluntary disclosures and insider transactions[J].Journal of Accounting&E-conomics,1999,27:305-326.
[8]Hamid Mehran,David Yermack.Compensation and top management turnover[R].NYUWorking Paper,No.FIN-98-051,1997.
[9]Efendi,Srivastava,Swanson.Why do corporate managers misstate financial statements?The role of option compensation and other factors[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2007,85(3):667-708.
[10]McAnally,Srivastava,Weaver.Executive stock options,missed earnings targets,andearnings management[J].The Accounting Review,2008,83(1):185-216.
[11]Burns,Kedia,Lipson.The effects of institutional ownership and monitoring:Evidencefromfinancial restatements[R].Working Paper,University of Texas,2006.
[12]Beneish,Vargus.Insider trading,earnings quality and accrual mispricing[J].The Ac-counting Review,2002,77(4):755-791.
[13]Stock options tax rules[S].http://www.irs.gov,2010-04-04.
[14]Yermark D.Good ti ming:CEOstock options awards and company hens announcements[J].Journal of Finance,1997,52:449-476.
引用本文
娄贺统, 郑慧莲, 张海平, 等. 上市公司高管股权激励所得税规定与激励效用冲突分析[J]. 财经研究, 2010, 36(9): 38–48.
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