This paper empirically tests management timing in the listed companies when the mangers are awarded stock options. It comes to the results as follows:firstly, interval pricing samples award the management timing stock options to reduce exercise prices; secondly, interval and daily pricing samples have timing good information disclosure after the pricing benchmark date to increase the value of stock options; thirdly, with large power of the management, lower-degree corporate governance and state-owned ultimate controllers, the probability of simultaneous timing stock options and information disclosure by the management is higher and the proportion of intangible assets&firm size reduce the probability abovementioned. It enriches and extends existing management timing research, and is of great significance to effective promotion of management stock options plan and the inhibition on management timing behavior.
Stock Options and Management Timing:Evidence from China
Journal of Finance and Economics Vol. 42, Issue 04, pp. 123 - 133 (2016) DOI:10.16538/j.cnki.jfe.2016.04.012
Cite this article
Cu Weihua. Stock Options and Management Timing:Evidence from China[J]. Journal of Finance and Economics, 2016, 42(4): 123–133.
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