The relationship between the policy propaganda and the policy implementation of local governments in China is investigated in this study, using local governments’ postures on urban construction investment bonds（UCIBs）showed in their annual government work reports（AGWRs）and the actual issuance of UCIBs as an example. As a development-oriented government, in order to improve infrastructure and promote local economic growth, local governments in China have a large funding gap. However, due to the prohibition of debt financing by the central government, urban investment companies and local financing platforms are gradually emerging in China. The bonds issued by these urban investment companies and local financing platforms are called " UCIBs”, with distinct Chinese characteristics: Although the issuing subject is not local governments, the government bears the implicit guarantee responsibility, and the actual debt repayment mechanism is also the government finance. The issuance of UCIBs does solve the funding gap problem of local governments. However, there are also many problems in the development of UCIBs. In some places, the debt rate is far beyond the scope of risk control, which has brought great risks and caused widespread concern of the whole society.
Therefore, it is particularly important to strengthen the risk control of UCIBs, which has indeed become the focus of the central government since 2014. Although the central government attaches great importance to it, it still depends on the attitude and action of local governments. Based on the statistics of more than 3600 AGWRs of 308 cities in China from 2006 to 2017, it is found that with more attention of the central government being paid to debt risks, local governments in China have shown more and more strong postures on restraining UCIBs issuance and preventing debt risks. However, if to curb local debt risks is the real purpose of local governments, reducing the number of UCIBs issued is obviously the most direct means, but until 2017, the number of UCIBs issued has been rising steadily. On the one hand, the number of UCIBs has reached a new high; on the other hand, the voice of restraining local debt risks in the AGWRs of local governments has been rising.
After matching those posture data in AGWRs with the actual issuance information of UCIBs, it is found that in a certain year, the cities in which UCIBs will be issued more, local governments are more inclined to show the postures of restraining debt risks in AGWRs at the beginning of the year. There is a direct contradiction between policy propaganda and policy implementation. However, further research also finds that the postures on restraining UCIBs can reduce the risk premiums of UCIBs at the marginal level, which means that it is rational for local governments to put more emphasis on the restraint of debt risks, when they are going to issue more UCIBs.
The investigation of this study will help us to understand the role of local governments in China’s market of UCIBs, and provide reference for preventing and resolving local debt risks. Moreover, the investigation of this issue will help us to understand the relationship between the policy propaganda and the actual implementation of local governments, and provide reference for the relevant reform. Finally, the research of this paper can also provide inspiration for the research of extracting big data from the text for emotional analysis: whether the emotion and attitude expressed in the text is a reflection of the real idea or just a propaganda declaration.