5207 
6315近年来，国内一些食品加工企业热衷于通过自建上游生产基地等方式实施纵向整合，以此向公众显示其在质控能力上的高额投资。同时，面对该项投资，消费者对企业的实际质量控制水平却缺乏足够的信任。文章构建了一个包含事前能力投资与事后追责的不对称信息博弈模型对此现象进行了解释。我们发现：由于能力投资背后的质控努力是企业的私人信息，企业将可能闲置一部分投资，其实际的质控努力水平可能会低于事前投资所蕴含的质控潜能，从而在显性投资水平与隐性质控行为上表现出“名不副实”的特征，导致在投资上的“策略性产能过剩”。进一步，增强监督的有效性和加大对低质量行为的惩罚可以促进企业采取“名副其实”的高水平质控。文章的研究有助于从微观层面解析质量与效率的内在关系，所得结论不局限于食品安全领域，也能为我国科研资助及精准扶贫等其他领域的政策设计提供一定启发，有助于深入理解质量强国战略。
“名不副实”与“名副其实”问题的一个经济学解析——以食品安全为例
摘要
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引用本文
李想, 黄安楠, 李昕玮. “名不副实”与“名副其实”问题的一个经济学解析——以食品安全为例[J]. 财经研究, 2018, 44(9): 109-122.
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