Government functions should serve the national strategy, and should change as the national strategy changes. In the early stage of Chinese reform and opening-up, the national strategy must be centered on economic constructions. To achieve this goal, the arrangement of fiscal decentralization and political centralization assessment play a positive role; local officials launch a " promotion championship” to achieve economic growth. Under this system, China’s economy has achieved rapid development over the past more than 30 years. However, behind the rapid economic development, there are a lot of hidden dangers; many regional governments pay too much attention to attract as much capital as possible. This would lead to the imbalance between economic development and social public service supply, breed local sectarianism and official corruption, and would deviate seriously from the intrinsic motivation of the decentralization system.　　The 19th session of the National People’s Congress pointed out that China’s economic model has shifted from the high-speed development stage to the high-quality development stage. Thus, the national overall strategy should be transformed into the development idea of advocating innovation, coordination, and green, opening and sharing while stressing economic construction. Therefore, the government’s functional objectives will also shift from a single economic goal to diversity goals, including economic, social, political, etc. In the process of transformation, how to coordinate the relationship between economic goals and other objectives, and how to balance the relationship between officials’ performance assessment and the government’s comprehensive evaluation are important contents in the " new normal economy”. 　　In the governance mechanisms, the officials transfer system is an important arrangement for the central government to coordinate regional development and implement the strategic intention of regional development. However, can it play a substantial role in practical application? In this paper, we select 11 076 observations between 2008−2015 from the listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock market in China as our samples, analyze the relationship between corporate investment and government subsidies, and test whether the officials transfer arrangement can play a regulation role above them. As a result, we find that: first, the more the listed companies invest, the more government subsidies they will receive; second, for both vertical and horizontal transfer officials, when the term is longer or the area is more developed, the inhibition function will be more obvious; third, the government subsidy obtained through equity investment has a significant negative impact on enterprise performance, but the officials transfer system can restrain the local government rent-seeking behavior to some extent.　　The contributions of this article lie in that: First, the existing literature on the officials transfer system mainly focuses on the economic development, the party style construction and so on, while our paper empirically analyzes the regulation role of the local officials transfer system from the perspective of regional investment behaviors, and also helps to identify and evaluate the influence of local officials on economic development. Thus, we not only enrich the research of relevant literature, but also help to understand the intention of the central government to allocate local administration consciously. Second, from the perspective of investment, our paper expounds that different types of officials transfer to the same place, the same type of officials transfer to different places, and the roles played by the local government to the economic development are different, thus reflecting the function that the official plays should be based on a certain area of resources endowment as a prerequisite. Third, the conclusions of this paper further support the idea which our central government promotes the " reduction of government direct intervention in micro-economy” in recent years, and help to better understand how to optimize the relationship between governments and enterprises.