EU Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive grants member states’ resolution authorities the administrative power to write down bank liabilities and/or convert them into the banks shares, which enable credit the fundamental basis of the bail-in function. The public interest nature of bank risk resolution goal endows the bail-in mechanism with the legitimacy of disposing the credit. However, there are no clear sequences among the conflicted resolution goals of EU bank risk resolution, burying the hidden danger of credit protection imbalance. The bail-in mechanism improves the elements of bankruptcy liquidation procedure, and makes provisions for trigger conditions, qualified liabilities and their minimum standards, the sequence of debt disposal, and " no less than bankruptcy treatment” & their exceptions, but there is great discretion. EU bail-in mechanism is not applicable for qualified liabilities under the item of third party documents, weakens the effectiveness of risk resolution, and leaves space for a reply to bail-in measures in a third country. It is inappropriate for China in practice to recognize and enforce EU bail-in measures under the BRRD. China may insist to discipline the bail-in power at the global finance governance level and may finitely legislate the bail-in regime.
Credit Protection under the EU Bail-in Regime and China’s Reply
Journal of Shanghai University of Finance and Economics Vol. 19, Issue 05, pp. 103 - 115 (2017) DOI:10.16538/j.cnki.jsufe.2017.05.009
Cite this article
Guo Huachun. Credit Protection under the EU Bail-in Regime and China’s Reply[J]. Journal of Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, 2017, 19(5): 103–115.