The harm of the “Choose One out of the Two” behavior of bilateral platform enterprises to market competition is widespread, but their antitrust regulations have always been ineffective. Ultimately, it is due to the neglect of the negative impact of the integration of bilateral platforms and online trading markets on theoretical and practical aspects of competition disorder and equity imbalance. Bilateral platforms are not only online trading services provided by platform enterprises, but also virtual market spaces for merchants to operate and compete online. In fact, platform enterprises have dual identities as market service providers and market managers. In addition, platform enterprises have independence due to their lack of interconnection and high transfer costs, resulting in strong locking capabilities. The multi-channel model further weakens the substitutability between platform enterprises, thereby strengthening their market advantages. From the perspective of power attributes, the market management rights of platform enterprises stem from the aggregation of individual service contracts between the platform and a large number of merchants and consumers. The management behavior of platform enterprises with private law attributes poses a risk of abuse, and the “Choose One out of the Two” behavior of bilateral platform enterprises is significantly different from traditional exclusive trading behavior, which has a more direct and serious effect of excluding or restricting competition. However, due to the lack of systematic coordination and planning in the legislation of market regulations in China, the antitrust law and other market economy laws have not formed a clear legal order within the market regulation legal system, with clear hierarchy between upper and lower laws and mutual coordination between the same law. The problem of chaotic legal application is common in practice. In the long run, in the process of regulating the “Choose One out of the Two” behavior of bilateral platform enterprises, it is necessary to not only solve the application difficulties of the antitrust law and make efficient choices of antitrust regulation modes, but also appropriately explain, innovate, and break through the application of traditional exclusive trading and antitrust regulation theories, ultimately achieving consumer rights protection, balancing the interests of bilateral platform enterprises and their platform operators, standardizing the competition rules of the economic entities of platform enterprises, and promoting a fair and free competition order for bilateral platform enterprises.