1581 
1793随着《京津冀协同发展规划纲要》的出台，京津冀地区进入一个新的发展时期。这项重大国家战略对京津冀地区的产业发展、环境治理、市场一体化等方面具有重要影响。文章在理论分析的基础上，使用包含异质性的面板数据政策评价计量模型，从污染物产生和排放的视角，讨论了《京津冀协同发展规划纲要》对京津冀地区环境治理的政策效应。研究发现，《京津冀协同发展规划纲要》在保持经济增长的前提下，在环境治理方面呈现出显著的政策效应。在政策实施后第二年，工业二氧化硫的产生总量和排放总量分别减少了25%和14%，单位产生量和单位排放量分别减少了25%和15%。此外，政策效应随距离衰减的问题得到较好解决，不存在明显的区域异质性。文章还进行了模型的交叉验证和稳健性检验，证实了研究结果的可靠性。文章的研究为优化完善区域政策、更好推动区域协调发展提供了借鉴。
区域联动环境政策是否减少了污染物？——基于《京津冀协同发展规划纲要》环境治理的政策评价
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忻恺, 张瑞涵, 朱震宇, 等. 区域联动环境政策是否减少了污染物？——基于《京津冀协同发展规划纲要》环境治理的政策评价[J]. 财经研究, 2024, 50(3): 19-32.
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