, 1, 2, 3, 4
6974 
7690近年来，中国金融行业高管的天价薪酬引发舆论热议，国内外学者开始探究银行高管薪酬设计的合理性。鉴于学界和业界对银行业高管薪酬科学性的质疑，本文基于中国沪深上市银行2009—2012年的相关数据，探究银行业高管天价薪酬以及高管—员工薪酬差距的成因，并考察其对银行风险的影响。具体来说，本文首先研究了银行高管权力对高管薪酬的影响，在此基础上，探究了银行公司治理水平对高管权力与高管薪酬关系的调节效应。同时，还研究了银行高管薪酬及高管—员工薪酬差距对银行风险的影响。研究发现，在中国上市银行中，高管权力显著促进了高管薪酬水平的提升，而银行治理水平能够负向调节高管权力与高管薪酬的正相关关系，同时银行内部薪酬差距可以诱发银行风险。研究结论表明，中国银行业应当适度削弱高管权力，努力提高银行治理水平，以此确保高管薪酬设计的科学合理性，同时适当缩小高管—员工薪酬差距，以防范薪酬异常差距导致的银行风险。
银行高管薪酬的权力诱因与风险后果研究
摘要
参考文献
6 吴育辉, 吴世农. 高管薪酬: 激励还是自利?——来自中国上市公司的证据[J].会计研究, 2010, （11）: 40–48. DOI:10.3969/j.issn.1003-2886.2010.11.007
8 Adams J S. Inequity in social exchange[J]. Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 1965, 2: 267–299. DOI:10.1016/S0065-2601(08)60108-2
9 Bebchuk L A, Fried J M. Executive compensation as an agency problem[J]. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2003, 17（3）: 71–92. DOI:10.1257/089533003769204362
10 Bebchuk L A, Fried J M. How to tie equity compensation to long-term results[J]. Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 2010, 22（1）: 99–106. DOI:10.1111/jacf.2010.22.issue-1
11 Brooks A, Zeitz G. The effects of total quality management and perceived justice on organizational commitment of hospital nursing staff[J]. Journal of Quality Management, 1999, 4（1）: 69–93. DOI:10.1016/S1084-8568(99)80096-0
12 Chen J J, Liu X G, Li W A. The effect of insider control and global benchmarks on Chinese executive compensation[J]. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 2010, 18（2）: 107–123. DOI:10.1111/corg.2010.18.issue-2
13 Cordeiro J J, He L R, Conyon M, et al. Informativeness of performance measures and Chinese executive compensation[J]. Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 2013, 30（4）: 1031–1058. DOI:10.1007/s10490-013-9353-9
14 Cordeiro J, He L R, Conyon M, et al. Chinese executive compensation: the role of asymmetric performance benchmarks[J]. The European Journal of Finance, 2016, 22（4-6）: 484–505. DOI:10.1080/1351847X.2013.769892
15 Fahlenbrach R, Stulz R M. Bank CEO incentives and the credit crisis[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 2011, 99（1）: 11–26. DOI:10.1016/j.jfineco.2010.08.010
16 Finkelstein S. Power in top management teams: Dimensions, measurement, and validation[J]. Academy of Management Journal, 1992, 35（3）: 505–538. DOI:10.2307/256485
17 Hagendorff J, Vallascas F. CEO pay incentives and risk-taking: Evidence from bank acquisitions[J]. Journal of Corporate Finance, 2011, 17（4）: 1078–1095. DOI:10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2011.04.009
18 Kato T, Long C. Executive compensation, firm performance, and corporate governance in China: Evidence from firms listed in the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges[J]. Economic Development and Cultural Change, 2006, 54（4）: 945–983. DOI:10.1086/503583
19 Korsgaard M A, Schweiger D M, Sapienza H J. Building commitment, attachment, and trust in strategic decision-making teams: The role of procedural justice[J]. Academy of Management Journal, 1995, 38（1）: 60–84. DOI:10.2307/256728
20 Luo Y L, Jackson D. Executive compensation, ownership structure and firm performance in Chinese financial corporations[J]. Global Business and Finance Review, 2012, 17（1）: 56–74.
21 Malmendier U, Tate G. CEO overconfidence and corporate investment[J]. The Journal of Finance, 2005a, 60（6）: 2661–2700. DOI:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00813.x
22 Malmendier U, Tate G. Does overconfidence affect corporate investment? CEO overconfidence measures revisited[J]. European Financial Management, 2005b, 11（5）: 649–659. DOI:10.1111/eufm.2005.11.issue-5
23 Sakawa H, Moriyama K, Watanabel N. Relation between top executive compensation structure and corporate governance: Evidence from Japanese public disclosed data[J]. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 2012, 20（6）: 593–608. DOI:10.1111/corg.2012.20.issue-6
引用本文
游志郎, 余耀东, 韩小明, 等. 银行高管薪酬的权力诱因与风险后果研究[J]. 外国经济与管理, 2017, 39(4): 41–51.
导出参考文献，格式为：
