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6586管理层持股计划是现代公司治理的重要内容之一，旨在将管理层利益与股东财富有机地结合在一起，达到保护投资者利益、持续增加股东财富的治理目标。在中国，鉴于国有公司治理自身存在的诸多先天不足，实施管理层持股计划被赋予了更加积极的意义。本文探讨在国有控股与非国有控股状态下，管理层持股比例对股权资本成本的影响。结果显示，管理层持股比例的设计及其变化是管理层持股计划的关键环节，对公司资本成本水平产生直接影响，进而决定着公司综合竞争力的变化；我国国有控股上市公司和非国有控股上市公司的管理层持股比例与股权资本成本均呈倒U形关系；同时，国有控股上市公司的资本成本对于管理层持股比例的变化比非国有控股上市公司更加敏感。这表明，只有基于资本成本的变化来设计管理层的持股比例，才能够保证管理层持股计划的有效性，实现其正向效应。本文为上市公司管理层持股比例的设置提供了理论依据和建设性意见。
管理层持股与股权资本成本
摘要
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引用本文
汪平, 王晓娜. 管理层持股与股权资本成本[J]. 外国经济与管理, 2017, 39(2): 60–71.
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