文章使用2004-2013年我国国有上市公司数据,考察了国有企业金字塔层级如何影响经理激励契约,以及这种影响在不同政治关联的情况下是否存在差异。研究发现,国有企业的金字塔层级越长,经理薪酬与会计业绩的相关性越强,经理更可能因糟糕的会计业绩而被更换;同时,在经理没有政治关联的样本中,上述现象更加明显。上述结果说明,国有企业金字塔结构是政府放权的一种制度安排,降低了国有企业面临的政治成本。但文章也发现,对于业绩良好的企业,金字塔层级过长可能导致经理拥有过度权力,从而出现操纵薪酬的现象。文章的发现对于深化国有企业改革具有重要的政策含义。
金字塔层级降低了国有企业的政治成本吗?——基于经理激励视角的研究
摘要
参考文献
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引用本文
周静, 辛清泉. 金字塔层级降低了国有企业的政治成本吗?——基于经理激励视角的研究[J]. 财经研究, 2017, 43(1): 29–40.
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