隐性保险体制下城市商业银行的市场约束行为
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财经研究 2008 年 第 34 卷第 05 期, 页码：42 - 53
摘要
参考文献
摘要
文章分别从价格约束、数量约束、外部环境对市场约束的影响等角度,研究了基于隐性保险体制下的我国城市商业银行的市场约束行为。研究发现:(1)我国地方城市商业银行的储蓄市场不存在显著的价格约束效应,但没有证据表明一定不存在数量约束效应。(2)政府隐性保险对银行债权人的价格决策和数量决策均有显著影响,且价格决策比数量决策、短期储蓄比长期储蓄受到政府隐性保险更大的影响。(3)省会城市城商行的市场约束力度要弱于非省会城市的城商行。
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[3]Ellis David M,Mark J Flannery.Does the debt market assess large banks’risk?[J].Journal of Monetary Economics,1992,30:481-502.
[4]Erlend Nier,Ursel Baumann.Market discipline,information disclosure and moral hazardin Banking[J].Journal of Financial Intermediation,2006,15:332-361.
[5]Flannery M,Rangan K.What caused the bank capital build-up of the 1990s?[R].Working Paper,FDIC Center for Financial Research,2004.
[6]Flannery Mark J,Sorin MSorescu.Evidence of bank market discipline in subordinateddebenture yields:1983-1991[J].Journal of Finance,1996,51:1347-1377.
[7]Gorton G,G Pennacchi.Financial intermediaries and liquidity creation[J].Journal ofFinance,1990,45:49-72.
[8]Gorton Gary,Athony MSantomero.Market discipline and bank subordinated debt[J].Journal of Money,Credit,and Banking,1990,22:119-128.
[9]J Daley K Matthews,K Whitfield.Too-big-to-fail:Bankfailure and banking policyin Ja-maica[R].Working Paper,Cardiff Business School,2006,4.
[10]Keeley MC.Deposit insurance,risk and market power in banking[J].American Eco-nomic Review,1990,80:1183-1200.
[11]Martinez Peria M,Schmukler S.Do depositors punish banks for bad behavior?[J].Journal of Finance,2001,56:1029-1051.
[12]Masami I mai.Market discipline and deposit insurance reformin Japan[J].Journal ofBanking&Finance,2006,30:3433-3452.
[13]Park S,Peristiani S.Market discipline by thrift depositors[J].Journal of Money,Credit,and Banking,1998,30(3):347-364.
[14]Park,Sangkyun.Market discipline by depositors:Evidence from reduced-form equa-tions[J].Quarterly Reviewof Economics and Finance,1995,35:497-514.
[15]张正平,何广文.隐性保险、市场约束与我国银行业改革[J].金融研究,2005,(10):42-52.
引用本文
许友传, 何佳. 隐性保险体制下城市商业银行的市场约束行为[J]. 财经研究, 2008, 34(5): 42–53.
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