策略性采购联盟、集体谈判与最优贸易政策选择——基于广义Cournot-Nash谈判函数的分析
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财经研究 2008 年 第 34 卷第 03 期, 页码：39 - 49
摘要
参考文献
摘要
文章发展了一个关于由本国企业组成的中间品策略性采购联盟与外国垄断性供给者进行集体谈判的模型——该模型以中国的制造业外包服务,即出口加工贸易实践为基础,其中,中间品的采购价格与数量通过有效的Nash谈判过程同时决定。当采购联盟的效用函数的数量弹性高于(低于)价格弹性,则该联盟的偏好为数量(价格)导向的。文章证明:(1)当本国与外国的中间品与最终产品贸易具有互补性时,政府贸易政策调整的价格、数量以及福利效应是不确定的,它们依存于本国采购联盟的偏好、最终产品需求曲线的弹性与曲率、外国企业的技术以及生产专业化程度;(2)政府贸易政策的干预功能与企业策略性联盟的自主调整功能存在重叠与冲突。
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[2]Brander James A,Barbara J Spencer.Unionized oligopoly and international trade policy[J].Journal of International Economics,1988,24:217-234.
[3]Brecher Richard A,Ngo Van Long.Trade unions in an open economy:A general equilib-rium analysis[J].Economic Record,1989,65:234-239.
[4]Grossman,Gene.International competition and the unionized sector[J].Canadian Journalof Economics,1984,17:541-556.
[5]Hall Robert E,David M.Lilien.Efficient wage bargains under uncertain supply and de-mand[J].American Economic Review,1979,69:868-879.
[6]Ishikawa J,Barbara J Spencer.Rent-shifting export subsidies with an imported interme-diate product[J].Journal of International Economics,1999,48:199-232.
[7]McDonald Ian M,Robert Solow.Wage bargaining and employment[J].American Eco-nomic Review,1981,71:896-908
[8]Melitz Marc J.The impact of trade on intra-industry reallocations and aggregate indus-try productivity[J].Econometrica,2003,71:1695-1725.
[9]Mezzetti C,Elias Dinopoulos.Domestic unionization and import competition[J].Journalof International Economics,1991,31:79-100.
[10]Nash John.The bargaining problem[J].Econometrica,1950,28:155-162.
[11]Qiu Larry D,Barbara J Spencer.Keiretsu and relationship-specific investments:implicationsfor market-opening policies[J].Journal of International Economics,2002,58:49-79.
[12]Spencer B J,Jones R W.Vertical foreclosure and international trade policy[J].Reviewof Economic Studies,1991,58:153-170.
[13]Spencer Barbara J,Larry D Qiu.Keiretsu and relationship-specific investments:barrierto trade?[J].International Economic Review,2001,42:871-901.
引用本文
王根蓓. 策略性采购联盟、集体谈判与最优贸易政策选择——基于广义Cournot-Nash谈判函数的分析[J]. 财经研究, 2008, 34(3): 39–49.
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